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Abstract 
One of the major issues associated with taxation are the costs incurred by taxpayers when 
they comply with their tax obligations, this is particularly important for smaller business 
taxpayers. Compliance costs are found to be regressive, falling with disproportionate 
severity on smaller businesses. This trend can be found across the globe and more 
importantly, in New Zealand. Prior research has shown that the severity of the 
regressiveness has increased over time. The current, “one-size-fits-all”, approach used in 
the New Zealand tax system, and others alike, have created undue complexity for small 
businesses. This study reviews small business tax regimes and concessions currently 
implemented (or proposed) in different countries to relieve the compliance burden for 
smaller businesses. Australia, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States 
have either implemented a separate tax regime, or offers tax concessions to smaller 
business taxpayers. New Zealand on the other hand, presents minor ad hoc tax 
concessions for small business taxpayers, but since 2009, there have been proposals to 
change this system. This study evaluates and compares all the implemented (or proposed) 
regimes and concessions of the selected countries. Following from the case studies, 
interviews are conducted with tax professionals that have worked closely with smaller 
businesses, in order to shed light on the possibility of implementing a similar regime in 
New Zealand. The findings show that a small business tax regime has many avenues to 
consider, however, there is general consensus that suggests small business taxation should 
be kept as simple as possible. This thesis puts forward a baseline for further discussion 
and development of a small business regime to reduce compliance costs for smaller 
businesses. 
iii 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to thank my supervisors, Assoc. Prof Andrew Maples and Prof. Adrian 
Sawyer for their support and guidance throughout the year. I am blessed and honoured to 
have worked with them through several projects; I have thoroughly enjoyed this 
invaluable experience.  
I would also like to thank the Accounting and Taxation faculty for the opportunity to 
further my learning. I would like to thank all of those that supported me throughout my 
University career. I will never forget my time at Canterbury University. 
I would like to finally thank my family and my friends for their support and 
encouragement. Thank you to my parents for giving me this opportunity and supporting 
throughout my life. Thank you to my brother and sister for all the support you give me. 
As for my friends, you know guys know who you are, thank you for always being around.  
Thank you very much to everyone.  
iv 
 
 
Currency Exchange Rates as at 1 February 2015 
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Australian Dollar  AUD$1 $1.07 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background to the Topic 
In most countries, the small business sector is a vital component for the local economy 
because it provides employment, innovation and economic growth (Tran-Nam & Glover, 
2002). In fact, Rupasingha (2013) found that local entrepreneurs and small businesses 
have a more positive effect on local economic performance than larger local businesses. 
New Zealand is no different, as the small to medium sized enterprise (SME) sector 
represents 97.2 per cent of all enterprises, employs 30.2 per cent of all employees and 
contributes 27.8 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) (Ministry of Business, 
Innovation and Employment 2013). Similarly, Australia’s small business sector makes up 
95.6 per cent of all businesses, and combined with the medium sized sector, the total 
SME sector comprises 99.7 per cent of all enterprises (Department of Innovation Industry 
Science and Research, 2011). The SME sector clearly represents a major component of a 
local economy. However, many tax systems use a one-size-fits-all approach (meaning 
that smaller businesses are not always treated differently than larger ones), which gives 
rise to ‘complexity creep’ for smaller businesses, and increased complexity means 
increased costs (NZICA & TMNZ, 2009). It is well known that small business tend to 
bear a disproportionate burden of tax compliance costs (Tran-Nam & Glover, 2002).  
Sandford and Hasseldine (1992) found that the compliance costs of business taxes in New 
Zealand were regressive, which meant that the burden of compliance costs fall 
disproportionately on smaller entities than larger ones. Subsequent studies (Brunton, 
2005; Inland Revenue, 2010, Gupta & Sawyer, 2015) continue to find that the compliance 
costs impose a greater burden on smaller businesses, due to their limited resources and 
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the insufficient cash flow benefits stemming from compliance with tax laws. Overall from 
the earliest studies in 1992 to 2015, the last 20 years of compliance research has provided 
evidence to support the fact that the regressivity of compliance costs has not significantly 
decreased, but in fact, it has increased.  
New Zealand has not implemented a specific regime or a comprehensive system for small 
businesses to combat the regressive nature of compliance costs. However, New Zealand 
has adopted an ad hoc approach by providing concessions aimed towards smaller business 
taxpayers to ease the burden of tax compliance. Examples of these include a depreciation 
write-off of up to $500 (Inland Revenue, 2012), removal of yearly stocktakes (Chapman 
Upchurch Limited, 2014), and deductions for start-up legal fees of up to $10,000 (Inland 
Revenue, 2014). As research has shown, the regressive burden of compliance costs has 
increased over time (Brunton, 2005; Inland Revenue, 2010, Gupta & Sawyer, 2015), 
despite the inclusion of these concessions. This suggests that something further needs to 
be done to combat this regressiveness. 
New Zealand’s largest member professional accounting body, the New Zealand Institute 
of Chartered Accountants (NZICA),
1
 with support from Tax Management New Zealand 
(TMNZ), introduced a proposal, in 2009,
2
 to simplify the tax system for small and micro 
businesses. In 2012, a revised version of the initial proposal was subsequently released in 
the light of the initial feedback from submissions.
3
 The proposal aims to reduce the time 
spent on tax compliance activities for small businesses, consequently freeing-up time for 
taxpayers and/or accountants. Other tax jurisdictions, such as Australia, South Africa, the 
                                                 
1
 Now known as Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand as the New Zealand Institute of 
Chartered Accountants have merged with Chartered Accountants Australia with effect from a date in 2015. 
However, NZICA will continue to be used throughout this project unless stated otherwise. 
2
 Simplifying the Taxation of Small Business in New Zealand SME Tax: One Hour per Month (2009). 
Retrieved from http://www.smetax.co.nz/reports/2009-report/. 
3
 Simplifying the Taxation of Small Business in New Zealand SME Tax: One Hour per Month (2012). 
Retrieved from http://www.smetax.co.nz/reports/2012-report/. 
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United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) have recognised the disproportionate 
burden of tax regulations on smaller businesses, and have implemented different regimes 
and concessions to reduce the burden of tax compliance for these businesses. Comparing 
the different concessions and provisions provided within each regime will help in the 
design of a best practice template for supporting small businesses in New Zealand. 
A regime to simplify the tax system for small businesses in New Zealand is still in the 
development (discussion) stage; consequently the impact on small businesses can only be 
speculative. The aim of this study is to analyse a selection of implemented (or proposed) 
regimes and systems, so the weaknesses and strengths of each regime can be drawn 
together to create a best practice template for New Zealand. Therefore, in this research 
project, I propose two research questions as follows: 
RQ1. What tax regimes are currently in place (or proposed) for small businesses, in a 
group of selected countries, to reduce the tax compliance burden of these businesses? 
RQ2. Of the tax regimes (and specific provisions) implemented or proposed in these 
selected countries, which of them, if implemented, could be expected to reduce the 
compliance costs of taxation for small businesses in New Zealand? 
Policymakers in New Zealand will initially be the main beneficiaries of this research 
because the findings from this thesis should help in the decision whether to implement a 
small business tax regime. However, the findings from the research will not be limited to 
a New Zealand context, as the best practice template may be applicable in other 
jurisdictions, such as Canada, which has expressed interest in developing a regime to 
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simplify the taxes for small businesses, with the aim of reducing the compliance burden 
of taxes.
4
  
No single definition for “small business” is adopted in this study. Rather the term ‘small 
business’ is interpreted in accordance with the definition adopted in each jurisdiction.  
This research used a case study approach to answer the first research question. A 
preliminary review of small business regimes from different countries revealed that 
relatively few countries have adopted a small business tax regime. Therefore, the scope of 
the investigation included all countries known to have a regime with the information 
available, namely Australia, South Africa, the UK, and the US, as well as a consideration 
of the regime recommended for New Zealand. It should be noted that the US does not 
have a separate regime, but rather offer ad hoc concessions targeted towards small 
businesses. These are analysed the same as the other regimes. As a part of the author’s 
earlier research analysed regimes in Australia and the UK, comparing them to New 
Zealand’s actual and recommended regime. This research extends. This thesis uses 
documentary analysis to collect information about the existing regimes. Once the 
information from each country is analysed, key components from the different regimes 
were extracted and aggregated.  
The second research question was addressed using a series of semi-structured interviews 
with tax professionals. Tax professionals were defined in this research project as 
individuals who have had substantial tax experience in New Zealand, either as 
practitioners or advisors to professional accounting bodies. The interviews provide further 
clarity on whether a small business regime should be implemented in New Zealand, and if 
so, how it should be structured. The interviewees are provided with a list of concessions, 
                                                 
4
 Retrieved from: http://www.cica.ca/focus-on-practice-areas/taxation/conversations-about-
tax/entries/item77477.aspx. 
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drawn from the documentary analysis, and the interview questions, prior to the interview, 
to enable them to give prior consideration when offering their opinions of the study. 
1.2 Importance of the Topic and Purpose 
The motivation for this thesis is the concern that compliance costs are borne 
disproportionately by smaller businesses, which in turn leads to non-compliance with the 
tax law. The SME sector in New Zealand represents the majority of businesses. 
According to Jackson and Milliron (1986), the costs associated with tax compliance may 
be a factor in tax non-compliance. Hall and Rabushka
5
 (as cited in Jackson and Milliron, 
1986, p. 144) state that “…because of labour and/or expense involved, some taxpayers 
may not be sufficiently motivated either to make the effort themselves or to pay for 
professional assistance in order to comply with the law”. This is especially important 
since taxpayers are responsible for assessing their taxable income and income tax 
liability.
6
 Richardson and Sawyer (2001) provide an updated review of a number of tax 
compliance variables. However, the relationship between compliance costs and taxpayer 
behaviour remains under-researched. Further research will be required to determine the 
extent to which compliance costs affects non-compliance. 
Australia, South Africa, the UK, and the US have implemented regimes or provided 
concessions to reduce compliance costs for smaller businesses, with the potential to 
subsequently increase voluntary compliance by their smaller businesses. New Zealand, on 
the other hand, has not implemented a system to address this regressivity of compliance 
costs.  
                                                 
5
 Hall, R., and Rabushka, A (1982), Low Tax, Simple Tax, Flat Tax. 
6
 In 2001, the Tax Administration Act 1994 formalised self-assessment in the New Zealand tax system. 
Retrieved from: https://www.ird.govt.nz/technical-tax/legislation/2005/2005-111/2005-111-remedial-
issues/ri-date-self-assessment/. 
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New Zealand operates on a tax system that applies to all businesses, big and small. . 
However, NZICA with the support of TMNZ, released proposals to generate discussion 
with the intention to introduce a similar regime in New Zealand. The findings of this 
research should firstly provide a basis for further development of a preferential tax regime 
in New Zealand for smaller businesses to, in essence, ‘level the playing field’ in terms of 
compliance costs. Second, the findings from this study intended to generate discussion in 
other countries that are also deciding whether to introduce a tax regime designed for 
smaller businesses.  
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is arranged in the following manner. Chapter 2 reviews prior 
research on the cost of tax compliance from several different countries, and the impact 
and extent will be contrasted between larger and smaller businesses. Chapter 3 provides 
the research questions, research methods and research approach utilised in this project. 
Chapter 4 contains the case studies drawn from the selected countries’ small business 
regimes or concessions that have been implemented or (in the case of New Zealand) 
proposed. Chapter 5 presents the information collected from the interviews with the tax 
professionals, followed by Chapter 6, which sets an overall discussion about the findings 
and provides a conclusion for this thesis, along with limitations and areas of future 
research. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations is one of the earliest writings that identifies a cost 
associated with tax compliance (Smith, 1995). While he does not use the term compliance 
cost, three of the canons of taxation were concerned with compliance costs. The 
principles of certainty and convenience are directly related to compliance costs, while 
economy in operation has some relation to compliance costs. Sandford, Godwin, and 
Hardwick (1989) was the first study to identify and distinguish compliance costs from 
administrative costs. The authors describe compliance costs as the costs incurred by 
taxpayers complying with the requirements of the tax law. Whereas administrative costs, 
are the costs incurred by the revenue authority in collecting tax revenue, such as wages 
and salaries for their staff.  
Compliance costs are a consequence of having complex, inconsistent and poorly 
structured tax law (McKerchar, Ingraham, & Karlinsky, 2005). The authors further find 
that complex tax laws result in reduced technical accuracy when filing returns by both tax 
professionals and individual taxpayers. Therefore, the movement towards greater self-
assessment, which shifts the burden of tax assessment from the tax authorities to 
taxpayers, may contribute to both intentional and unintentional non-compliance (James & 
Alley, 2002). 
According to McKerchar et al. (2005) small businesses appear to be the group most 
adversely affected by increasing tax law complexity and escalating compliance costs. The 
literature review in this section examines different studies that describe and quantify the 
compliance costs faced by small businesses relative to larger businesses from the main 
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countries of interest (New Zealand, Australia, South Africa, the UK, and the US). Other 
countries are also discussed, but to a lesser degree due to limited data and analysis that is 
available with respect of those other countries. 
2.2 Different Compliance Costs of Business Taxation 
According to Sandford and Hasseldine (1992) compliance costs are the costs incurred by 
individuals and businesses as a result of meeting the requirements of the tax system. 
These costs are over and above the payment of the tax itself. Walpole (1999) describes 
these costs as “pure” compliance costs, examples of which include taxpayers’ own labour, 
the unpaid assistance and internal staff costs, costs of external advisors, and incidental or 
overhead costs (postage, stationery, or computer costs).  
Hanefah, Ariff, and Kasipillai (2002) further categorise these costs as either internal or 
external costs. Internal costs are related to the time spent by staff maintaining and 
preparing information for professional advisers, completing tax returns, and dealing with 
revenue authorities. External costs can be described as payments made to acquire services 
of lawyers, accountants and investment advisers from outside the taxpayers’ organisation.  
There are different types of compliance costs such as monetary, time and psychological 
costs. Monetary costs and time costs have predominately been researched in compliance 
cost studies, as Sandford and Hasseldine (1992) explain that time costs can be easily 
converted into monetary terms, (although different opinions as to the conversion rate will 
arise). Psychological costs of compliance can be very difficult to measure reliably in 
monetary terms (Woellner, Coleman, Mckerchar, Walpole, & Zetler, 2007). The authors 
suggest that taxpayers could be asked what they will pay to have someone else undertake 
their compliance obligations. However, this method is recognised as highly subjective 
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responses, and consequently, these costs have been excluded from the calculation of the 
total cost of tax compliance in many compliance studies (Walpole, 1999; Tran-Nam & 
Glover, 2002; Colmar Brunton, 2005; Hansford & Hasseldine, 2012; Gupta & Sawyer, 
2015). While psychological costs are excluded in the calculation of the total compliance 
cost, they should not be assumed to be unimportant, as Sandford and Hasseldine (1992) 
find that the frustration, hassle and anxiety arising from meeting tax obligations have 
some adverse economic consequences.  
The intended outcome of this thesis aims to identify ways to reduce all forms of tax 
compliance costs for smaller businesses, lessen the monetary expense, reducing the time 
spent filing or preparing records, and consequently reducing the levels of stress and 
anxiety, while increasing the taxpayers’ confidence of the accuracy of their tax position 
when filing their returns.  
2.3 Quantifying the Costs of Business tax Compliance 
In this section, the review focuses on studies that quantify tax compliance costs in New 
Zealand, Australia, South Africa, the UK, and the US. Four of these five countries have 
implemented small business tax regimes or concessions to reduce compliance costs. With 
respect to New Zealand, while no small business tax regime exists at present, there has 
been a proposal tabled by NZICA and TMNZ for such a regime, as well as New Zealand 
being the focal point of the study and place of residence for the researcher; hence the 
inclusion of New Zealand. Other countries (Slovenia, Croatia, Armenia, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore) will also be reviewed but not to the same depth as the other five countries due 
to the limited critique available in respect of these countries.  
10 
 
When evaluating the cost of tax compliance, consideration must be given to the 
distinction between gross and net compliance costs. Sandford et al. (1989) explain that 
the compliance effects many not always be entirely detrimental, and that there may be 
benefits from compliance, which constitute an offset to the cost. Benefits of tax 
compliance include cash flow advantages, such that businesses have the use of tax 
revenues for a period before they must be handed over to the revenue authorities. 
Furthermore, there are also managerial benefits from tax compliance, as explained in 
Lignier (2009) as tax compliance encourages business owners to maintain good 
accounting records. By reducing the total compliance costs by the associated benefits 
(that is giving net compliance costs), it will provide a more accurate evaluation of the 
compliance burden faced by businesses. However, many studies do not reduce the 
compliance costs by the associated benefits, so fluctuations between results can be 
expected. 
2.3.1 New Zealand 
Sandford and Hasseldine (1992) is the earliest comprehensive business compliance cost 
study conducted in a New Zealand context. Prior to their study, the Consultative 
Committee on Tax Simplification (The Waugh Committee) had proposed different ways 
in which the tax laws could be simplified (Tax Simplification Consultative Committee, 
1990). This led to the funding for the study of Sandford and Hasseldine (1992) from the 
Inland Revenue Department (IRD). The purpose for their study was to evaluate the 
compliance costs of the tax legislation prior to any simplification changes, in order to 
establish a benchmark for follow-up studies in the future. The authors used two separate 
mail surveys
7
 to collect their data on the costs of compliance. One of the surveys 
                                                 
7
 Two surveys were used because the authors believed that a single survey would have required an 
extensive questionnaire, which may adversely affect response rates. 
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collected data on the costs related to the employers, such as pay-as-you-earn (PAYE), 
fringe benefit tax (FBT) and other withholding taxes on employees’ income. The other 
related to goods and services tax (GST) and business income tax.  
The overall compliance costs of business taxation was estimated to be approximately 
$1,882 million, which was made up from 46.5 million hours of time spent and costs of 
over $600 million paid for external advisers fees as well as other various costs. The 
average compliance cost associated with the smallest sized business group (turnover less 
than $30,000) was equivalent to 13.4 per cent of the firm’s turnover (or $3,345).8 This 
compared to the equivalent of 0.03 per cent of turnover (or $59,404)
9
 for the largest 
business group (turnover more than $50 million). Sandford and Hasseldine (1992) found 
evidence to suggest that compliance costs of business taxation are regressive, both 
individually to each tax and collectively for all taxes. 
In 2004, the IRD commissioned Colmar Brunton to measure the compliance burden of 
taxation on SMEs (Colmar Brunton, 2005). This study found that the average amount of 
time a business spent per year on internal tax activities was approximately 76.7 hours, 
with the most time spent complying with GST, then followed by income tax 
requirements. The average combined compliance cost (internal and external) on SMEs 
was $4,024.
10
 The compliance cost for the smallest businesses explored in thier study 
(turnover of up to $19,999), was 21 per cent of the firm’s total turnover, when compared 
to the largest businesses (turnover of up to $1.3 million) was 0.2 per cent of turnover. 
Colmar Brunton’s findings show that the compliance costs were regressive; this is not 
only consistent with Sandford and Hasseldine (1992), but also shows that the regressivity 
had not been reduced over the 10 year period, and in fact showed an increase. 
                                                 
8
 $3,345, adjusted for inflation from 1992 to 2014 is $5,400.  
9
 $59,404, adjusted for inflation from 1992 to 2014 is $95,899. 
10
 $4,024, adjusted for inflation from 2004 to 2014 is $5,192. 
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The follow-up study, Inland Revenue (2010), found that average combined compliance 
costs had risen in nominal terms to $5,557.
11
 When compared to the 2004 study (Colmar 
Brunton, 2005), compliance costs actually decreased by 1.3 per cent (adjusted for 
inflation), primarily as a result in the reduction in the total amount of time spent on tax 
compliance activities. This finding was unexpected due to the additional hours needed to 
comply with KiwiSaver,
12
 and additional student loan repayments (from an increased 
proportion of businesses with student loan payers). No definitive answer could explain 
this decrease, but Inland Revenue’s researchers hypothesise that: differences in the SME 
demographic characteristics, the impact of the economic recession, or incremental 
changes in tax policy (either individually or collectively) could have had an effect on the 
result. While there has been an overall decrease in compliance costs, the regressivity 
remains. 
Gupta and Sawyer (2015) conducted the most recent investigation into the compliance 
burden for small businesses in New Zealand, as well as contributed to a larger 
international project including Australia (Lignier & Evans, 2012) , South Africa 
(Smulders, Stiglingh, Franzsen, & Fletcher, 2012), the UK (Hansford & Hasseldine, 
2012), Ireland, Canada and the US. While the parameters of the study were kept in line 
with the larger international comparisons, limited comparisons can still be made with the 
earlier New Zealand studies (Colmar Brunton, 2005; Inland Revenue, 2010). Gupta and 
Sawyer’s study finds that the average total amount of hours spent on tax compliance 
activities was 479.17 per year, with GST contributing to more than half of the total time 
spent. This contributed to an average combined cost of compliance of $31,096. This 
figure was comparatively larger when compared against prior studies (Sandford & 
                                                 
11
 $5,557, adjusted for inflation from 2010 to 2014 is $6,063. 
12
 KiwiSaver is a Government initiative set up to help save for retirement, usually deducted at source. 
Retrieved from https://www.kiwisaver.govt.nz/new/about/. 
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Hasseldine, 1992; Colmar Brunton, 2005; Inland Revenue, 2010). The authors were 
unable to explain such a difference in the result. Furthermore, Gupta and Sawyer (2015) 
reaffirm that compliance costs continue to be regressive based on business size. 
2.3.2 Australia 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Pope et al.
13
 (as cited in Chittenden, Kauser, & 
Poutziouris, 2003, p.104) conducted the majority of the early compliance costs of taxation 
research in Australia. The overall findings from these studies show that the estimated 
burden of complying with tax law are disproportionately high, with company taxes being 
the most burdensome. According to Chittenden et al. (2003), the Australian Tax Office 
(ATO) had expressed doubts about the reliability of the results from the Pope et al. 
studies. The Australian Taxation Studies Program (ATAX)
14
 attempted to provide a more 
comprehensive picture of the compliance costs associated with taxation. The ATAX study 
confirms that small businesses (turnover less than AUD$100,000 [$107,000]) are 
significantly burdened with compliance costs, particularly in terms of the total number of 
hours taken up. The collected data suggests that 90 per cent of all time costs are borne by 
small firms. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that the compliance costs for larger 
firms are, in essence, negative due to corresponding tax deductions and cash flow 
benefits. 
The Review of Business Taxation (RBT), led by John Ralph, submitted its report to the 
Treasury in 1999 (Ralph, Allert, & Joss, 1999). The recommendations of the RBT led to 
various changes to the tax base, for example, a reduction in the corporate tax rate from 33 
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per cent to 30 per cent. The RBT also led to the adoption of a new tax regime for small 
businesses, known as the Simplified Tax System (STS). The purpose of the system was to 
eliminate the additional and regressive compliance burden faced by small business. The 
initial eligibility criteria into the STS was that a business must have a turnover of less 
than AUD$1 million [$1,070,000] and less than AUD$3 million [$3,210,000] worth of 
depreciable assets. The STS had various tax concessions available for its members, such 
as the use of cash accounting, simpler depreciation methods and simpler trading stock 
requirements when determining their taxable income. Due to the low-take up rate and 
criticism of the STS’s design, the system was subsequently revised and replaced by the 
Small Business Entities (SBE) regime in 2007 (Dirkis and Bondfield, 2004; Mckerchar, 
2007; Tretola, 2007; Kenny, 2008). The SBE regime is currently used in Australia, both 
the STS and SBE regimes will be discussed later in Chapter 4. 
Tran-Nam and Glover (2002) conducted a study to measure both the transitional and 
recurrent business compliance costs of the tax reform. The authors found that the mean 
gross transitional compliance costs were AUD$5,442 [$5,822] per small business, and 
after taking into account tax deductibility and direct subsidies, the average compliance 
costs were estimated to AUD$3,815
15
 [$4,082]. The study also noted that most 
participants were unaware of the STS, while others confused the STS with another tax 
initiative, such as GST. As a result, the study did not capture the effectiveness of the STS 
at reducing compliance costs. 
Lignier and Evans (2012) conducted a study in 2010 to collect fresh data about the 
compliance burden imposed by the tax system upon small business taxpayers. This study 
was completed as a part of a larger international comparative study, similar to New 
Zealand’s study (Gupta & Sawyer, 2015). Lignier and Evan’s study recognises the lack of 
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a universal measure for what qualifies as a ‘small business’, so for their study any 
business with 50 or less full-time employees will constitute a ‘small business’. Their 
study found that the average time spent on tax compliance activities was 493 hours per 
year, and more than half the time was spent on GST activities. In addition, the authors 
compared this finding to an earlier study by Evans et al.
16
 (as cited in Lignier and Evans, 
2012) to determine which activity consumed the most time, prior to the introduction of 
GST in 2000. They found that recording information was most time consuming, which 
suggests that the introduction of GST would have severely increased the amount of time 
spent on compliance activities. The average combined cost of tax compliance for 
businesses with 50 or fewer employees was AUD$32,389
17
 [$34,656]. However, the 
findings of the study should be interpreted cautiously, as the sample was skewed towards 
larger businesses.
18
 The overall finding does suggest that the regressivity of compliance 
costs have not subsided, and in fact, the regressivity may have increased since 1995.  
2.3.3 South Africa 
Smulders and Stiglingh (2008) aim to establish the first study into the compliance costs 
by small businesses in South Africa. An electronic questionnaire was administered to all 
South African tax practitioners that were registered with the South African Institute of 
Chartered Accounts (SAICA), the South African Institute of Professional Accountants 
(SAIPA) or the South African Institute of Certified Bookkeepers (SAICB), consequently 
no sample was selected and the entire population was used. The findings show that of all 
the taxes tested (income tax, provisional tax, Value Added Tax (VAT), PAYE), VAT 
appeared to be, on average, the most time consuming activity for tax practitioners, 
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spending 18.77 hours compared to 3.07 hours spent on income tax. The average fee 
practitioners charged their clients, to ensure that all their tax returns were prepared, 
completed and submitted, was R7,030
19
 [$773] per year. When the cost associated with 
tax compliance are represented as a percentage over turnover, smaller businesses 
(turnover R1 to R300,000) [$0.11 to $33,000] bear 11.5 per cent of the cost compared to 
the largest (turnover R6,000,000 to R14,000,000) [$660,000 to $1,540,000] who only 
bear 0.3 per cent cost. This preliminary study into the external compliance costs faced by 
small businesses in South Africa is consistent with other compliance studies.  
Smulders, Stiglingh, Franzsen, and Fletcher (2012) provide more recent data to establish 
a baseline for further research within South Africa, as well as forming part of a larger 
international project involving other countries namely New Zealand (Gupta & Sawyer, 
2015) and Australia (Lignier & Evans, 2012). On average, small businesses spent 255.1 
hours on tax activities (including VAT, income tax, PAYE, Capital Gains Tax (CGT), 
customs, and excise duties) which contributes to the average total internal compliance 
cost of R53,357 [$5,869] per year. The most time-consuming tax activity was found to be 
complying with VAT requirements. Seeking external tax compliance assistance costs 
were on average R9,982 [$1,098] per year, which when compared to the earlier study 
(Smulders & Stiglingh, 2008) had only increased a minor amount when taking inflation 
into consideration of. The average combined cost of compliance was R63,328 [$6,966] 
per year. The overall finding from this study provides further evidence supporting the fact 
that compliance costs are regressive in nature and that VAT/GST is the most significant. 
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2.3.4 The United Kingdom 
Sandford et al. (1989) conducted an early study to evaluate the administrative and 
compliance costs of taxation in the UK. The majority of the data used in their study was 
gathered from four different surveys. Their study measured the costs incurred complying 
with VAT, PAYE and company tax. Results from the study show that compliance costs of 
all taxes fall disproportionately on smaller businesses, because small businesses (with 
turnover of up to £100,000 [$207,000]) incurs an average cost of 3.66 per cent of 
turnover, compared to large businesses (turnover over £1 million[$2,070,000]) which 
incur on average 0.17 per cent of turnover. VAT and PAYE were shown to be the most 
significant contributors to total compliance costs because information needed to be 
continuously recorded and tax paid frequently, whereas company taxes were assessed and 
paid annually.  
Parallel studies of compliance costs have been undertaken by the Small Business 
Research Trust (SBRT) (1998; 1999; 2000, as cited in Chittenden et al. 2003).
20
 In 1998, 
the SBRT conducted a study on the perceptions of VAT compliance costs. They found 
that businesses with lower turnovers experienced proportionally higher costs when 
compared with larger firms. When compared to the findings of Sandford et al. (1989), the 
compliance costs of VAT appear to have increased. However, the SBRT did not quantify 
the actual cost but relied on the perceptions of business owners, which could have led to 
overstatements and may not be directly comparable. Overall, the findings reinforced the 
existing evidence that suggests the disproportionate burden of compliance costs falling on 
small businesses. 
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In 1998, the UK Inland Revenue
21
 (as cited in Chittenden et al. 2003) published a report 
on the compliance costs associated with PAYE. The research was structured in order to 
make it possible to compare its findings with those of the SBRT and Sandford et al. 
(1989). The findings of the UK Inland Revenue study showed that the estimates of PAYE 
compliance costs were similar to the findings in Sandford et al. (1989). This suggests that 
the compliance costs associated with PAYE had not decreased, and remained significant. 
Chittenden, Kauser, and Poutziouris (2005) conducted a follow-up study on the 
compliance costs associated with PAYE and National Insurance Contributions (NIC).
22
 
Using questionnaires to estimate the compliance costs, the findings were similar to those 
of past studies such that the compliance costs were regressive. The authors suggest that 
the primary reason for the regressive nature of these costs is due to the number of hours 
that the business owners spend on PAYE. The smallest businesses were shown to spend 
the most time on PAYE, while delegating the least amount of work to other staff 
members. Upon further analysis, the authors estimated that the first employee, in terms of 
compliance costs, will cost a small business (employing between 10 and 49 employees) 
approximately £5.50
23
 [$11.39] per week, while a large company (over 50 employees) 
incurs less than 10 pence per week per employee. Thus, the regressivity of PAYE has not 
differed from prior studies. 
Hansford and Hasseldine (2012) provide a recent study on the compliance costs faced by 
UK small businesses, as a part of a larger international project including New Zealand 
and Australia. Using a similar research methodology as Lignier & Evans (2012) and 
Gupta & Sawyer (2015), the authors find that average combined cost of compliance was 
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£21,362 [$44,219]. However, the sample was slightly skewed to larger businesses, so 
interpretation of the results should be made with caution. When the compliance costs are 
scaled by the number of full time employees, the average cost of compliance decreased 
from £4,410 [$9,128] (small firms are those with a turnover less than £600,000 
[$1,242,000]) to £361 [$747] (large firms are those with a turnover greater than 
£6,500,000 [$13,455,000]). Compliance with VAT requirements on average take up more 
than half the time spent on all taxes (including company tax, PAYE and CGT). Overall, 
the study supports existing literature that suggests the compliance costs of taxation are 
regressive and VAT requirements were the most costly from a time perspective. 
2.3.5 The United States 
According to Slemrod and Venkatesh (2002), quantitative evidence about the compliance 
costs borne by businesses is limited in the US, as the majority of early compliance studies 
estimated the costs incurred by individuals. This study focuses on the compliance costs 
incurred by medium to large sized businesses (having at least USD$5 million 
[$6,850,000] in assets), so interpretation of the average total compliance cost may not be 
relevant for this study. However, Slemrod and Venkatesh presented data to show the 
regressive nature of compliance costs, as larger firms (USD$100 million to USD$250 
million assets [$137,000,000 to $342,500,000]) with assets 10 to 50 times the size of a 
smaller firm (USD$5 million to USD$10 million assets [$6,850,000 to $13,700,000]) 
only incurred seven times the average amount of compliance costs spent by smaller firms. 
While this finding does not specifically deal with ‘smaller businesses’ like other studies, 
it does show that compliance costs are disproportionately borne by business which are 
smaller. 
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Donald, Greenland, Guyton, Hennessey, and Kindlon (2006) conducted one of the first 
small business focused compliance cost studies. The study used a survey to collect 
information about the income tax burden on small business. The average compliance cost 
of income tax was approximately USD$2,266
24
 [$3,104], with an average of 255 hours 
spent per year on compliance activities. The smallest businesses in the sample (assets less 
than USD$10,000 [$13,700]) incurred USD$4,769
25
 [$6,533] per employee, compared to 
the largest in the sample (assets over USD$1 million [$1,370,000]) incurring 
USD$1,295
26
 [$1,774] per employee. Further analysis about the relationship between 
time and money shows that the time burden increases monotonically with size of money 
burden, and vice versa. This means that initiatives structured to reduce the amount of time 
spent on other compliance activities will also reduce the amount of money spent on 
compliance costs. Overall, the study provides more evidence to suggest that compliance 
costs are indeed regressive in the US.  
2.2.6 Other Countries 
This section reviews different European and Asian countries that have conducted research 
on the compliance costs of businesses in their respective country to see what insights 
these countries provide. 
Jrbashyan and Harutyunyan (2006) provide some evidence on the compliance costs of 
Armenia being regressive. The authors analysed the transaction costs of the taxes paid, in 
terms of sales volume and the number of employees. The general conclusion was that the 
transaction costs were more costly for small and medium sized business. Klun and Blazic 
(2005) provide an overview of compliance costs in Slovenia and Croatia. Their findings 
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are consistent with past research, in that the costs of compliance are regressive. The 
compliance costs, as a percentage of total turnover, for small business was 3.73 per cent 
(Slovenia) and 3.42 per cent (Croatia), compared to large business incurring 0.08 per cent 
(Slovenia) and 0.09 per cent (Croatia). These findings are comparable to those of the 
studies in the preceding sections. 
Ariff, Ismail, and Loh (1997) conducted a study on the compliance costs of Singapore. 
The authors divided their sample into three groups (small, medium or large entities) in 
order to determine whether the compliance costs were regressive. They find that the 
average combined cost of compliance was SGD$27,446
27
 [$27,994] with small and 
medium sized entities incurred more external than internal costs. The authors suggest that 
smaller businesses normally lack in-house tax support because they incur fewer and less 
complex tax problems, so it is not cost efficient to employ specialised personnel. Overall, 
the costs are disproportionately borne by smaller entities, which is again consistent with 
the consensus that compliance costs are regressive. Chan, Cheung, Ariff, and Loh (1999) 
conducted a similar study in Hong Kong, using similar parameters as Ariff et al. (1997). 
The average combined total compliance cost is HKD$346,483
28
 [$62,366]. This figure 
may seem large because the sample was slightly skewed to larger businesses. It appears 
that all sizes of businesses relied heavily on external assistance, which contradicts the 
finding in Afiff et al. (1997). The study was conducted in a different country, which could 
explain the inconsistency, despite following a similar research method. Finally, the 
authors explored the regressivity phenomenon and found that compliance costs tend to 
fall as sales increase. 
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2.4 Summary 
The overall findings from each country have shown that the disproportionate burden of 
compliance costs on small business continues to be an issue in almost every jurisdiction. 
From early studies to the most recent ones, the estimated compliance costs of business 
taxation have overall become increasingly regressive. Another major finding is the time 
spent on GST/VAT requirements has consistently taken up, for most jurisdictions, 
considered a greater proportion of the total time spent on tax compliance activities. This 
indicates that tax concessionary systems should include a focus on reducing the costs 
associated with GST/VAT filing (with the exception of the US that does not have a 
comprehensive GST/VAT). 
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Chapter 3: Research Question, Design 
and Method 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the research questions and describe the methods used to answer 
these questions. The aim of this study is to add to the limited literature on small business 
tax regimes in New Zealand, as well as produce a discussion piece for further policy 
analysis and development. The nature of the research is therefore exploratory, so a 
qualitative approach will be used throughout the data collection process.  
3.2 Research Questions 
This research project has proposed two research questions: 
RQ1. What tax regimes are currently in place (or proposed) for small businesses, in a 
group of selected countries, to reduce the tax compliance burden of these businesses? 
RQ2. Of the tax regimes (and specific provisions) implemented or proposed in these 
selected countries, which of them, if implemented, could be expected to reduce the 
compliance costs of taxation for small businesses in New Zealand? 
To answer the first research question, a series of case studies was used to present the 
specific tax regimes or concessions that each selected country have decided to implement 
(or proposed in the case of New Zealand). Documentary analysis was the method chosen 
to gather the information to write up each individual case study. Following on from that, 
the results of each case study will be subsequently analysed in order to extract the key 
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components (that is, small business tax concessions). The selected countries are New 
Zealand (the country with only a proposed regime), Australia, South Africa, the UK and 
the US. These countries have been selected because they have introduced (or proposed) a 
specific regime or concessions targeted towards smaller businesses that aims to simplify 
the tax system for them. In addition, they are all English-speaking countries with similar 
tax structures compared to New Zealand. As a part of the author’s prior research Australia 
and the UK’s systems in comparison to the current New Zealand practice and the 
proposed regime, has been undertaken. This thesis aims to build on top of the author’s 
existing work by analysing more countries. 
The second research question was answered through a series of interviews with tax 
professionals. Once each country has been analysed, the key concessions will be set out in 
a list. The concession list was presented to the tax professionals, to enable them to give 
their opinions on whether those concessions are viable in a New Zealand tax regime to 
help reduce the compliance cost burden of small businesses. Moreover, the interviews 
intend to gauge different thoughts as to how New Zealand should proceed in terms of 
future policy development and possible changes to the role of accountants in assisting 
small businesses.  
The following sections describe the research framework and methods used to answer the 
research questions. 
3.3 Theoretical Framework 
The ontological viewpoint in this thesis is based on normative theory, as well as using a 
positivist analysis, in terms of examining the existing tax regimes. El Kharbili and 
Stolarski (2009) explain that normative ontology allows the researcher to model policy-
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based regulations for creating new norms and rules. Using this theoretical framework, the 
results of this project can be used to develop and prescribe a set of standards that could be 
expected to reduce the compliance costs of small business. The methodology chosen for 
this research project is qualitative. McKerchar (2010) explains that qualitative 
methodology leads strongly to subjective rather than an objective reality. As explained 
above, the research project is exploratory in nature, so using qualitative information 
would be better suited in developing a foundation than quantitative data. Quantitative 
research requires a sample that is statistically representative of the population to be 
studied in order to establish generalisability. However, in qualitative research, a variety of 
participants are selected on the basis of their relation to the research topic, which is to 
enable meaningful differences in experiences to be captured (King and Horrocks, 2010). 
A normative approach will be used to evaluate the information from the interviews with 
the objective of providing recommendations as a result.  
3.4 Research Methods 
The research questions proposed for this thesis were answered using the following 
research methods. 
3.4.1 Case Study Analysis 
The study utilises a comparative case study analysis of the five selected countries, which 
have either implemented or proposed a regime for small business to combat the 
regressivity of compliance costs. Yin (2009, p. 4) describes case study research method 
as, “allowing investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life 
events”. In this case, it will involve the aspects of each regime or proposal. Exploratory 
research usually means that the research is in the preliminary stage, so there may be 
26 
 
difficulties in finding data. McKerchar (2010, p. 94) describes that, “a case study 
generally involves a researcher undertaking an in-depth exploration of a programme, an 
event, or a process concerning one or more individuals”. In this thesis, two types of case 
studies will be used, micro and macro. In the micro case studies, the ‘individual’ is each 
selected country that has implemented or proposed a small business tax regime. For the 
macro case study, comparisons will be drawn from the individual cases to provide a 
comparative analysis. 
The subjects of the each micro case study have been carefully selected through a process 
of preliminary research. The process involved finding countries that had, specifically, a 
tax regime or concessions designed for smaller businesses. Moreover, countries were 
further filtered by their tax structures’ similarity to New Zealand, whether they were 
English-speaking countries, and more importantly, whether information was publicly 
available and able to be obtained. The prior research yielded five countries: New Zealand, 
Australia, South Africa, the UK and the US. As a precautionary note, this is not an 
exhaustive list, and there are potentially other countries that may provide the similar, if 
not, better information. However, as the research is in its exploratory stage, grasping an 
idea of what is currently available or proposed should be sufficient in building a 
foundation for further research.  
Once the individual cases have been written up, the next step is to analyse them 
collectively. A comparative macro case study will draw out and aggregate the 
concessions and provisions offered to small business taxpayers. Zweigert and Kötz (1998) 
explain that comparative law studies make comparisons of different legal systems of the 
world. Furthermore, Thuronyi (2003) suggests that a country’s tax policy can benefit 
from comparative studies, particularly by learning from different countries’ experiences 
of implementing a similar regime. As explained above, the primary purpose of the 
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comparison is to draw out similarities and differences, in terms of tax concessions. The 
result of the macro case study will produce a list, which will then be used in the 
interviews with the tax professionals, where opinions and ideas can be shared and the list 
evaluated. 
3.4.2 Documentary Analysis 
Mogalakwe (2006) describes documentary analysis as an analysis of documents that 
contains information about a phenomenon the researcher wishes to study. Any ‘written 
text’ can be considered a document, with the main sources of documents able to be found 
in ministerial and departmental libraries, newspapers and databases. According to 
Mogalakwe, this method is just as good and more cost efficient than social surveys or in-
depth interviews. This is particularly important as the study requires information from 
several countries overseas. It would be expensive and impractical to travel to each 
country in order to collect data about each regime. Information for each regime can be 
collected through various sources, such as journal articles, legislation, governmental 
official reports, websites, online papers, media coverage, and statements made by 
professional bodies.  
While the benefits of documentary analysis were explained above, using this method has 
its limitations, the main one being that it is not possible to find and include every 
document about the regimes. Mogalakwe (2006) explains there is just too much 
information, especially now in the era of the information superhighway. The ever 
increasing amount of information places an extra burden on the user of documentary 
sources, especially when it comes to establishing their authenticity and credibility. One 
way to mitigate the risk of omitting important documents is to be diligent when collecting 
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data, such as revisiting relevant data sources will ensure coverage of new information that 
comes to light.  
3.4.3 Interviews 
The last research method used in this project will be utilising semi-structured interviews 
on several tax professionals who have shown interest in small business taxation. As the 
project is exploratory in nature, semi-structured interviews is believed to be the most 
appropriate method to gather more depth answers, which would allow greater exploration 
of the subject matter. The study does not look to generalise the population, so a survey 
method would not be appropriate. Bryman and Bell (2011) explains that an interview 
places a greater emphasis on the interviewees’ point-of-view and opinions on the subject 
matter. Semi-structured interviews tend to be more flexible in terms of the flow of the 
interview than structured interviews, meaning that follow-up questions could arise as a 
result of the interviewee’s responses (King and Horrocks, 2010). Semi-structured 
interviews also differ from structured interviews as an ‘interview guide’ will be used 
instead of a set of fixed questions in a predetermined order. The ‘interview guide’ 
contains a set of open-ended questions, or ‘probing questions’, and topics that would like 
to be covered in the interview (King and Horrocks, 2010). Due to the open-endedness of 
some questions, the interviewee may lead the discussion into unanticipated directions, 
which could introduce new ideas or answer following-on questions in the process. This 
method provides the best fit for this type of research, as the aim is to establish a 
foundation for future research on small business tax regimes. 
The subjects for interviews are determined, by first undergoing some preliminary research 
to seek appropriate ‘tax professionals’. King and Horrocks (2010) refer to this type of 
sampling as purposive, which means that chosen dimensions and categories will 
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determine the suitability of the candidate. This project defines, ‘tax professionals’ as 
those with many years of experience
29
 working in tax within New Zealand. King and 
Horrocks (2010) further explain that qualitative research seeks diversity in the 
participants in order to throw light on meaningful differences in experience. For this 
study, a mixture of tax practitioners in small to medium sized accounting firms, and 
members of various tax advisory bodies will be selected. The preliminary research hopes 
to select those tax professionals that work closely with smaller businesses. While they 
may not be representative of the tax profession in New Zealand, the views of these 
representatives may give a better understanding of the needs of small business in terms of 
designing a tax regime to reduce their compliance costs.   
(Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2006) suggests that interview research should have a 
minimum of twelve participants, but if the participants are highly homogenous then a 
sample of six would be sufficient. It is intended that six tax professionals will be recruited 
for interviewing in this study. Eriksson & Kovalainen (2008) argue that qualitative 
interviews need not be very long, stating that 30 minutes is enough, but can be longer to 
facilitate more in-depth answers. It is expected each interview to be between 30 to 40 
minutes to ensure all topics are discussed, while having enough time to accommodate 
richer information gathering. 
3.4.4 Telephone Interviews 
The subjects recruited for this thesis were not limited to the location of the researcher, in 
this case, Christchurch. A mixture of face-to-face and remote interviewing is used in this 
thesis. King and Horrocks (2010) suggest using remote interviewing for three reasons: 
physical distance from the participants, availability of participants, and the nature of the 
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interview topic. As the tax professionals are recruited based on their knowledge and 
expertise on the topic, rather than their location, remote interviewing is an inexpensive 
and less time consuming method of incorporating valuable participants in this research.  
King and Horrocks (2010) raise concerns about the quality of telephone interviews as 
there is a potential that the participants may misunderstand the nature of the interaction. 
The concerns stem from the perception, in literature, that telephone interviews are usually 
similar to structured surveys (King and Horrocks, 2010, p. 81). However, these concerns 
can be mitigated by explaining carefully to the potential participants what is expected 
during the interview. Information sheets and consent forms that contain information about 
the length of the interview were sent to those that expressed interest in participating in the 
study. This reinforces the point that a detailed discussion of the participants’ views and 
experiences on the subject is expected, similar to a face-to-face qualitative interview.  
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Chapter 4: Small Business Tax Regime 
Review 
4.1 Introduction 
A large body of literature has shown that the compliance costs of taxation are regressive, 
due to its ‘fixed-cost’ nature, which particularly disadvantages smaller businesses 
compared to larger ones, and thus has led to calls for compensation for small business 
(Pope, 2008). This chapter will answers the first research question: 
RQ1. What tax regimes are currently in place (or proposed) for small businesses, in a 
group of selected countries, to reduce the tax compliance burden of these businesses? 
A review of the five selected countries, first individually then collectively, in the order
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of New Zealand, Australia, South Africa, the UK and the US. As explained above, these 
countries have either implemented a simpler tax system for smaller businesses or one has 
been proposed. While the focus of each case study is to extract important concessions and 
provisions from each regime, it also explores the successes and criticisms experienced 
with the particular regimes implementation. This will give better insight into how a 
system should be structured for New Zealand.  
4.2 New Zealand 
The first country explored is New Zealand, as currently no comprehensive tax regime has 
yet been designed for smaller businesses. By and large New Zealand operates a tax 
system on a one-size-fits-all approach, with some concessions for smaller businesses, 
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 Aside from New Zealand the countries will be discussed in alphabetical order, as New Zealand will be 
the focus of this research. 
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namely $500 capital asset write-off, removal of stocktakes from some businesses, and 
claimable pre-trade legal expenses. According the Budget of 2014 (KPMG, 2014), there 
will be simplified financial reporting requirements for “non-large”31 businesses, meaning 
that these businesses will no longer be required to prepare general purpose audited 
accounts. This change may have an effect for those sitting on the ‘border’ of the 
thresholds, but for the smaller to the smallest businesses, there will be no effect, as they 
were not previously required to produce audited accounts. However, special purpose 
(albeit simplified) accounts are still required for tax purposes.  
While there have not been any significant changes to help lower their compliance costs, 
proposals for a simplification regime have recently been put forward by NZICA and 
TMNZ. Their initial discussion document Simplifying the Taxation of Small Business in 
New Zealand SME Tax: One Hour per Month released in 2009 (the 2009 proposal), is one 
of the first document in New Zealand that proposes a comprehensive to reduce the 
regressivity of tax compliance costs for small business. The proposed concessionary 
regime was based on the principles of simplicity, proportionality, certainty, and trade-offs 
which favour compliance friendliness, neutrality, and fairness (NZICA & TMNZ, 2009, 
p. 2). The document intended to create a baseline for further discussion, which led to a 
revised proposal in 2012 that adopted changes as suggested from the feedback. 
 4.2.1 Entry Thresholds 
The proposed regime would divide small businesses into two distinct groups based on the 
turnover and the number of employees. In order to be eligible for the regime, a business 
must meet the following: 
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 Business with a turnover of less than $30 million or assets of less than $60 million. 
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Table 1: Eligibility thresholds 2009 
 Micro Business Small Business 
Level of turnover less than $60,000 $1,200,000 
Number of employees No employees Does not specify 
The entry threshold for micro business is the same as the threshold for GST registration. 
‘Micro Business’ targets the smallest businesses and business start-ups. For that reason, 
these businesses must operate as either a sole trader or partnership and are not allowed to 
have employees. This system seeks to encourage more people with innovative ideas to 
enter the business world by removing a major component from the many barriers of entry. 
Furthermore, the micro business system also aims to incentivise businesses that derive 
income “under the table”32 to fully meet their tax obligations by offering a simplified 
system and no penalty to any undeclared income prior to joining the system. Where 
business turnover fluctuates around the $60,000 threshold, a 40 per cent safe harbour 
($84,000 turnover per year/$7,000 per month) prevents businesses from entering the 
system one year and then leave the next. When businesses grow beyond that safe harbour, 
they can transition to the ‘Small Business’ category, which has a different set of 
concessions and requirements.  
The threshold to enter the system as a “Small Business” requires that the business has a 
turnover of less than $1.2 million, in other words, established businesses with an active 
business income, while having no restrictions on the form of business structure. In 
addition, small businesses are able to have employees with no barrier of entry. The 
system hopes to substantially simplify taxation of income tax and fringe benefit tax by 
effectively putting the business on a cash accounting basis. Again, the thresholds allow 
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 “Under the table” refers to transactions that operate on usually a cash basis, which in turn does not get 
declared to the IRD. 
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for a safe harbour of 40 per cent ($1.68 million or $140,000 per month) before having to 
leave the system, and adhere to the normal tax rules.   
A follow-up discussion document was released in 2012, which revised the initial 2009 on 
the basis of criticisms and suggestions made from submissions, which, among other 
changes, lowered the upper turnover threshold for ‘small business’ to $600,000. The safe 
harbour 40 per cent ($840,000 or $70,000 per month) was retained to allow for 
fluctuations in turnover per year. Employee numbers have not been addressed in 
determining small business taxpayers, even with the subsequent revised version of the 
proposal. Table 2 presents the thresholds from the revised 2012 proposal. 
Table 2: Eligibility thresholds 2012 
 Micro Business Small Business 
Level of turnover less than $60,000 $600,000 
Number of employees No employees Does not specify 
4.2.2 Concessions offered 
As explained above, the NZICA and TMNZ proposed system distinguishes a between 
micro and a small business taxpayer, which means the concessions offered for each 
taxpayer group will be different. The following section first discusses the concessions 
offered to micro businesses and then for small businesses. 
4.2.2.1 Micro Business 
Initially the 2009 proposal, businesses that met the threshold of a micro business would 
be entitled to a final income tax rate of 15 per cent on gross turnover, which could be paid 
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monthly, or at any time. The 15 per cent includes a component of ACC levies,
33
 and all 
income would be transferred to the taxpayer’s (the business owner) summary of earnings 
and no further tax would be applicable on this business income. Another proposed feature 
included a transitional rule for people who earned cash ‘under the table’, which allowed 
them to enter the tax regime without further consequences from past year’s earnings from 
undeclared income.  
The revised version (the 2012 proposal) brought forth a change to the initial proposed 
final income tax rate of 15 per cent on gross turnover across the board, to 7 per cent for 
businesses primarily dealing in goods and 14 per cent for all other businesses. The initial 
15 per cent was criticised as being too high, especially for those that traded in goods 
because it did not allow for the costs of purchases. While this change addressed the ‘over-
taxing’ at predominantly trading taxpayers, there may be some definitional issues arising 
when it comes to determining whether a business deals primarily in goods or services. 
Also, this change provides an incentive to classify as dealing in goods. 
The key concessions of the proposed micro business regime were: 
 Different tax rates: Businesses would be able to calculate their income tax on a 
single flat rate; and 
 Timing of payments: Businesses could file their returns at a more convenient time. 
4.2.2.2 Small Business 
From the initial proposal to the more recent revised version, the only change to the small 
business regime was the threshold for entry. Businesses that meet the threshold of a small 
business would be entitled to calculate income tax and GST on a simplified cash basis. As 
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 ACC is New Zealand’s accident compensation scheme, which covers no-fault injury cover for all New 
Zealand residents and visitors. ACC is levied from New Zealand taxpayers at the source of their income. 
For more information http://www.acc.co.nz/about-acc/overview-of-acc/introduction-to-acc/index.htm.  
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a result of using, in essence, a payments basis to calculate income tax, GST and income 
payment dates could be merged. It is envisioned that income tax and GST would be paid 
two-monthly to avoid end of year total calculations, which also reduces the stress on cash 
flow at the end of the year. Consequentially, removing the need for end of year square ups 
mean that:  
 there is no need for end of year stocktakes; 
 depreciation on most assets (except land) can be deducted at purchase; 
 losses can be recognised earlier (carried back or forward, or refunded); 
 payment of provisional tax is removed, there is no fringe benefit tax and 
entertainment taxes; 
 no shareholder salaries issues (for example occurred in Penny and Hooper)34; and  
 social assistance and student loan obligations are also aligned with income tax 
payments.  
Businesses that currently operate as companies and partnerships, but are eligible for the 
small business regime, would be taxed similarly to a sole trader, which is based on the 
personal marginal tax rate structure.  
In addition, the proposed small business system would inherently overwrite some existing 
tax concessions, such as the $500 immediate write-off of low-value assets (Inland 
Revenue Department, 2004). The $10,000 closing stock valuation exemption Section EB 
23 of the Income Tax Act 2007 will also be removed. The overwrite these tax laws, would 
only be applicable for small businesses, not for all businesses. 
The key concessions of the proposed small business regime were: 
                                                 
34
 A New Zealand tax law case where the two surgeons held their business as a company because company 
taxes were lower than personal marginal rates. As a result, each party gave themselves an artificially low 
income, which was eventually deemed to be a tax avoidance arrangement. 
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 Cash accounting: Using cash receipts and payments to determine taxable income; 
 Simpler depreciation: Removing depreciation for these businesses as they can be 
deducted at the time of purchase; 
 Timing of payments: Businesses may file their returns at a more convenient time. 
For this regime, there is an alignment with GST payments; and 
 Trading stock: The need to conduct yearly stock takes is removed. 
4.2.3 Summary of Responses to the Proposals 
There has been limited published response on the proposals. The New Zealand Institute of 
Chartered Accountants (2012a) published an article titled Member Response, which 
looked at the issues and concerns of the chartered accountants. The main concerns about 
the proposed regime include: compromise of professional services; increased complexity 
from ‘tinkering and modifying’; additional workload for chartered accountants; and 
complications that could arise when different taxpayers use different tax systems. Cooper 
(1993) published work in Australia, suggests that tweaks and changes to existing tax laws 
for the purpose of reducing complexity, does not in fact reduce complexity, but tend to 
increase confusion among taxpayers.  
In contrast, another article published by the New Zealand Institute of Chartered 
Accountants (2012b) gauged the responses from the media,
35
 which appear to show 
support in favour for the proposals. Common themes that arose from the media sources 
include the belief that the new regime will eliminate the basic accountancy needs of a 
business; reductions in time spent filing tax returns; and encourage more people to start 
their own business. It is interesting to find that the opinions of practitioners differ 
significantly to those of the media. There could be many factors that lead to the difference 
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 Media sources include: ‘NZ Herald’, ‘Manawatu Standard’, ‘Stuff.co.nz’, ‘Scoop’, ‘Radio NZ morning 
news’, ‘TVNZ Breakfast’, ‘Interest.co.nz’, ‘NBR’. These are various news providers in New Zealand.  
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in opinions, but a major argument against having a regime for small, from an accountant’s 
standpoint, could be the fear of losing clients and future clients. However, as this is only a 
proposal, at this stage, an evaluation of its effectiveness in reducing compliance costs for 
smaller businesses, and its impact on accounting services is speculative. 
4.3 Australia 
Australia has had many years of experience with small business tax concessionary 
regimes, as having two regimes. In 2001,
36
 the first small business tax regime, known as 
the Simplified Tax System (STS), was introduced and implemented through legislation. 
However, this was subsequently replaced in 2007
37
 by amending legislation, now known 
as Small Business Entity (SBE) regime. Australia attempted to simplify its tax system by 
using these regimes in with the object of to reducing compliance costs for small 
businesses. The regimes will be discussed independently to compare and see how the 
regime has developed and adapted to the problems faced. 
 4.3.1 The Simplified Tax System 
From July 1 2001, a new tax regime was introduced for small businesses (not including 
individuals) in Australia. The Review of Business Taxation (RBT) submitted a report on 
the recommendations to the Australian Treasury in October 1999, which included a new 
tax regime for small businesses (Ralph et al., 1999). Ralph et al. explained that the STS 
was introduced for smaller businesses to help relieve some of the compliance burden 
associated with business taxes. This was very important because at this time GST had 
been introduced into Australia, and the STS hoped to make the transition for smaller 
businesses easier. The STS was introduced as the New Business Tax System (Simplified 
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 New Business Tax System (Simplified Tax System) Bill 2001. 
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 Enacted in the Tax Laws Amendment (Small Business) Bill 2007. 
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Tax System) Act 2001,
38
 which amended some sections in the Income Tax Assessment Act 
1997 (ITAA). 
4.3.1.1 Entry Thresholds 
Diagram 1: Shows how the STS rules relate to each other
39
 
 
As shown on Diagram 1, Subdivision 328-F of the ITTA 1997 outlines the thresholds for a 
business to be eligible to enter the STS for a year of income, if it carries on a business in 
that year, and has the following: 
Table 3: Eligibility thresholds to enter the STS 2001 
Average level of turnover less than AUD$1 million 
Depreciable assets less than AUD$3 million 
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 New Business Tax System (Simplified Tax System) Bill 2001 received its royal assent since 1 January 
2001. 
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 Schedule 1, item 1, subdivision 328-A of the ITTA 1997 
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The STS requires businesses to have an average turnover of less than AUD$1 million 
[$1,070,000] and depreciable assets less than AUD$3 million [$3,210,000], as shown on 
Table 3. The average turnover is calculated on either the current year’s turnover or using 
any three of the last four years. The inclusion of the depreciable assets threshold is to 
restrict businesses with low turnover, high capital asset investments to enter the STS. The 
RBT estimated that 95 per cent of all business in Australia would be eligible to adopt the 
STS (Ralph et al., 1999).  
The system was optional for those that meet the thresholds. However, if a taxpayer 
decided to, voluntarily, exit the regime, then, the taxpayer could not re-enter the regime 
until at least five years after the exit year, under Subdivision 328-G. There are no 
restrictions to those that cease to be eligible for the STS, and where they become eligible 
again, can re-enter the system. This restriction was implemented to stop those taking 
advantage of the STS by entering and leaving on a frequent basis. 
According to the 2006-07 Annual Budget, there were concerns about the complexity 
associated with a range of small business definitions in the tax law (Banks Taskforce, 
2006). As a result, the STS eligibility requirements were based solely on turnover and 
AUD$3 million [$3,210,000] asset threshold no longer applied. However, the upper 
turnover threshold was increased to AUD$2 million [$2,140,000] from AUD$1 million 
[$1,070,000] to capture an even larger population of business.  
4.3.1.2 Concessions Offered 
Organisations eligible for the STS are allowed to use cash accounting, simpler 
depreciation methods and simpler trading stock requirements to determine their taxable 
income for the year, as shown on Diagram 1. The STS is offered to businesses as a 
‘package’, meaning that those businesses that are eligible, and choose to enter the STS, 
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must adhere to all aspects (Tretola, 2007). Businesses are not be allowed to ‘pick and 
choose’ the concessions as they please. 
Subdivision 328-C outlines the accounting method for STS taxpayers. In essence, the 
taxpayers calculate their taxable income using cash accounting; that is, income is 
recorded when it is received and deductions accounted for when they are paid. It was 
believed that the cash accounting method for income provides a greater alignment with 
the cash accounting for GST.  
 Subdivision 328-D describes the simpler depreciation methods for STS taxpayers. 
Depreciating assets costing less than AUD$1,000 [$1,070] can be written off immediately 
and claimed as a deduction for the year in which the asset was first used. Depreciable 
assets costing more than AUD$1,000 with an effective life of less than 25 years, are 
pooled and depreciated at a diminishing value rate of 30 per cent. Lastly, depreciable 
assets costing more than AUD$1,000 with an effective life of more than 25 years are 
pooled and depreciated at a diminishing value rate of 5 per cent. Table 4 sets out this 
information. If the taxpayer decides to leave the STS, any pooled assets would continue to 
use the same rules, while newly acquired assets will need to be kept separate and 
depreciated using standard rules. 
Table 4: Simpler depreciation offered to STS taxpayers 
Useful life/Asset cost Less than AUD$1,000 More than AUD$1,000 
Less than 25 year life Written off  Pooled at 30% diminishing rate 
More than 25 year life Written off Pooled at 5% diminishing rate 
The last major concession offered to STS taxpayers is the simplified trading stock 
requirements, as outlined in Subdivision 328-E. This concession modifies the existing 
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laws on trading stock requirements for those parts of the STS. An adjustment is made to 
either assessable income or deductions, so if the value of trading stock on hand at the start 
of the year is greater than the value at the end of the year, then a deduction is allowed for 
the excess. By contrast, where the value of trading stock at the start of the year is less than 
the trading stock at the end of the year, then an amount is included in assessable income 
equal to the excess. 
The RBT assessed the impact of their recommendations with a Regulatory Impact 
Statement (RIS) (Costello, 2001). The assessment reviewed potential compliance, 
administrative and economic impacts of their recommendations in the Bill.
40
 It was 
assumed that businesses eligible for the regime would indeed enter it; therefore 95 per 
cent of all businesses in Australia would be affected. The first RIS considered the impact 
that the STS would have on compliance costs. As explained above, the introduction of the 
STS had the intention of reducing compliance costs for users of the STS. The cash 
accounting rules were expected to reduce compliance costs, as users will not be required 
to use time-consuming accrual accounting rules. The extent that simplified depreciation 
rules would reduce compliance costs would be dependent of the amount of capital assets 
held by the STS taxpayer, it was expected that these rules would at least reduce the 
number of calculations required. As for the simplified trading stock requirements, if the 
user could reasonably estimate the difference in value from the start to the end, then this 
would be beneficial in reducing compliance costs. Overall, the RBT believed that the STS 
would free up time for small businesses to focus on their day-to-day operations.  
The key concessions of this regime are: 
 Cash accounting: Using cash receipts and payments to determine taxable income; 
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 Simpler depreciation: An instant write off for assets up to a certain cost, while all 
assets are pooled with other similar life assets and depreciated at a standard rate; 
and 
 Trading stock: Easier assessment for excess deductions or taxable income. 
4.3.1.3 Summary of Responses to the Simplified Tax System 
The implementation of the STS for Australian businesses received a lot of criticism, while 
yielding minimal positive feedback. This section presents some of the comments made 
about the STS. 
Dirkis and Bondfield (2004) argued that the RBT did not accurately consider the impact 
of the compliance costs on small businesses, and with the introduction of GST in July 
2000, the STS overall proved to be inadequate to compensate for the regressivity of 
compliance costs of the GST. Furthermore, the authors provided two reasons as to why it 
failed, the first being that there was no compelling argument put forward for the STS at 
its introduction and the rules were poorly designed. They believed that there was no clear 
connection for why the reduction of business taxes would be ‘the answer’ to compensate 
small businesses for regressive compliance costs. 
McKerchar (2007) critically analysed the operation and impact of the STS from its 
inception to 2006. The average turnover threshold caused a problem when it came to 
‘grouped entities’, where the average turnover is to be calculated in any three of the last 
four years of operation. Where a business has not operated for more than four years, then 
the average will be calculated from the number of years it has operated. The provisions 
used to calculate the average turnover appear to be simple, but McKerchar argued that 
this was not the case, as evidenced by the length of the provisions (33 pages). Moreover, 
the inclusion of ‘grouped entities’ undoubtedly further complicated the calculation. As 
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stated above, the Australian 2006-07 Budget increased the STS turnover threshold from 
AUD$1 million to AUD$2 million, while removing the asset test. McKerchar questions 
whether these integrity measures were necessary, as the percentage of business outside 
the proposed threshold would be minute (McKerchar, 2007, p. 142).  
McKerchar (2007) is also sceptical about the cash accounting provisions providing any 
benefit for those that used accrual accounting to keep track of their creditors and debtors 
prior to the introduction of the STS. At the time of implementation, all concessions and 
provisions of the regime had to be used, due to the ‘package’ concept. Mandatory use of 
cash accounting was seen to deter a lot of eligible users into the system. Low take-up 
rates were a feature in the early years of the STS, with only 14 per cent of eligible 
taxpayers opting to use the STS by the end of 2002, providing some evidence to suggest 
mandatory provisions were unfavourable. In response to the low take-up rate, Subdivision 
328-C ITTA 1997 removed the mandatory cash accounting provision, so taxpayers that 
decided to enter the STS, from July 2005 onwards, were allowed to use the appropriate 
method of accounting that would give a ‘substantially correct reflex of the taxpayer’s true 
income’ (Tretola, 2007, p. 4). In other words, the appropriateness of an accounting 
method could be determined by the nature of the business, for example, a business that 
deals primarily in goods would be expected to use accrual accounting, and those dealing 
in services would be expected to use cash accounting. Taxpayers, who entered the STS 
prior to July 2005, had the option to choose which method they preferred. A consequence 
of the repeal was to add a provision to suspend the re-entry rule of five years for those 
who exited the regime. It was assumed that those taxpayers had left the regime because 
cash accounting was inappropriate for the nature of their business. With the removal of 
mandatory use of cash accounting, the STS saw an increased take-up rate from 14 per 
cent to 25-30 per cent (Tretola, 2007). This suggests that mandatory accounting was an 
45 
 
issue for some, but there remained a large number of taxpayers who did not take up the 
STS regime compared to the size of the sector. 
McKerchar (2007) further believed that simpler depreciation could increase complexity, 
and the simplified stocktake requirements were helpful depending on the taxpayers’ 
record keeping abilities. She suggests that leaving the regime would cause massive 
complexity issues, whereby the taxpayer must depreciate any pooled assets at the same 
rate, while newly acquired assets will need to be kept separate. This introduces 
complications for taxpayers because they need to maintain at least two distinct capital 
allowance systems for bookkeeping purposes. In terms of the new stocktake rules, the 
business owner needed to estimate ‘reasonably’ the difference in stock. However, reliable 
and accurate bookkeeping is required in order to meet those requirements; this may 
increase the time spent on bookkeeping activities, which in turn increases compliance 
costs. 
Overall, McKerchar (2007) believed that the STS regime was not simple, as the STS’s 
eligibility criteria and its mandatory depreciable asset provisions, were unnecessarily 
complex. She argues that the STS failed to reduce the effective tax burdens in terms of 
tax savings or a reduction in compliance costs. The STS has been labelled as a ‘system 
within a system’ and one that had not been developed with sufficient debate or research. 
In fact, the STS has increased the compliance burden, where taxpayers must calculate 
their financial position every year to determine whether they are still eligible. Many 
taxpayers will need to seek professional advice to determine whether to continue to meet 
the eligibility requirements, or whether it would be simpler to remain outside of the STS. 
McKerchar further suggests that the constant change to the provisions (for example, 
removal of the mandatory cash accounting) has an impact on taxpayers and tax 
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practitioners. Bondfield (2002a) describes this impact as ‘change fatigue’, but the extent 
of the impact on taxpayers is unknown. 
Dirkis and Bondfield (2002) and Tretola (2007) both agree that the STS rules were poorly 
designed, and claim that the STS had, effectively, added a further layer of policies on top 
of existing policies. Bondfield (2002b, p. 252) describes this as, “in effect a separate 
concessional regime within a large complex system”. Merely adding concessions on top 
of an existing tax system does not simplify the law; in fact, it becomes more complex. 
Therefore, small businesses, who were eligible and who elected to use the STS, would 
have further complicated their filing process. 
In their study, Tran-Nam and Glover (2002) found that there was widespread ignorance of 
the STS with participants unaware that it existed, while others confused it with another 
form of taxation, such as GST. The authors found that businesses that had already 
employed cash accounting for GST purposes would consider the STS as an option, 
though the decision to adopt the regime would be in the hands of their accountants. The 
authors sought the opinions of accountants and tax advisors, and found that they would 
not recommend the STS to most of their small business clients. It was believed that 
businesses having already reported on a cash basis, having high value creditors and low 
value debtors, while maintaining low levels of depreciable assets, would be unsuitable for 
the STS. This claim contradicts the RBT’s view that the STS would compensate small 
businesses affected by the tax reforms. Furthermore, it appears that there were some 
people had been misinformed about the STS, which could be a factor affecting the low 
take-up rates. 
While Tran-Nam and Glover (2002) found that there were minor benefits arising from the 
STS, the perception of the respondents (business owners) indicated that the new tax 
47 
 
system was “good for Australia”. This view contradicts the view of Dirkis and Bondfield 
(2004) and Tretola (2007), who believed that the STS had not been beneficial in 
simplifying the tax system or reducing compliance costs. Tretola (2007) further argued 
that the STS would not have any benefit for small businesses that already used cash 
accounting. The contrary finding from Tran-Nam and Glover (2002) may be due to the 
relatively small sample size and the business characteristics of the sample, as 23 of the 25 
small business studied already used cash accounting in their business before being 
introduced to the STS, and continued to do so after the regime was in place.  
In summary, the STS did not seem to help small businesses with their compliance costs; 
however, it should be noted that Australia had recognised that there needed to be a change 
for smaller businesses, in terms of taxation, and implemented a regime with the intention 
to reduce compliance costs.  
4.3.2 Small Business Entity Regime 
Due to the low take-up rate of the STS, the Australian Prime Minister and Australian the 
Treasury appointed a taskforce, in October 2005, to investigate practical options for 
reducing the compliance burden on businesses from government regulation. The Banks 
Taskforce (2006) published a report of 178 recommendations to reduce the compliance 
costs of regulatory burdens. The recommendations for small business from the Banks 
Taskforce were reflected in the Tax Laws Amendment (Small Business) Act 2007. In 
2007, the STS was replaced with a new concessionary regime known as the ‘Small 
Business Entity’ regime. The amendment Act amends Division 328 of the ITAA 1997, 
which replaces the STS and introduces SBEs. According to Kenny (2008) the SBE 
regime was designed to fix the problems that occurred in the STS. 
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4.3.2.1 Entry Thresholds 
As the SBE regime stems from the STS, many of aspects remained the same as the STS. 
The eligibility turnover thresholds remained the same from the last amendment in 2005, 
which had increased the thresholds from AUD$1 million [$1,070,000] to AUD$2 million 
[$2,140,000]. Similarly, the AUD$3 million [$3,210,000] depreciable asset test was not 
included in the eligibility test, in order to keep things as simple as possible. The increase 
in the turnover threshold means that even larger ‘small’ businesses would be able to enter 
the SBE regime. Kenny (2008) questions whether the system is still equitable towards 
small businesses, as larger ‘small’ businesses will benefit the most from the SBE regime. 
Diagram 2 presents the flow chart used to check eligibility into the SBE regime. 
Diagram 2: Flow chart to determine whether an entity is a Small Business Entity
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 Diagram 1.1 from Explanatory Memorandum of the Tax Laws Amendment (Small Business) Bill 2007. 
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4.3.2.2 Concessions Offered 
The tax concessions that were available in the STS (cash accounting, simplified 
depreciation and simpler trading stock requirements) would continue to be available for 
eligible SBEs, but are not offered as a ‘package’, in other words, the concessions were 
optional. This allowed eligible business to ‘pick and choose’ the aspects of the SBE 
regime that were relevant for their business (Marsden, Sadiq, & Wilkins, 2013). The 
concessions were kept the same up to 2012, where the depreciation rules changed, which 
now allowed SBEs to immediately write-off assets costing less than AUD$6,500 [$6,955] 
(increased from AUD$1,000 [$1,070]), and the two pooling groups were consolidated 
into a single pool with a single rate (Australian Taxation Office, 2012). In addition to the 
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STS’s tax concessions, a number of other concessions had been added for small 
businesses in an attempt to further compensate regressive compliance costs, and are 
presented on Diagram 3.  
Table 5: Concessions available for Small Business Entities
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However, some of these concessions available to SBEs contain alternative tests of entry, 
which undermines the simplicity achieved from having a single definition for small 
business (Kenny, 2008). An example of this is the CGT (capital gains tax) concessions 
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which are available for SBEs or businesses that have net assets of less than AUD$6 
million.
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The key concessions from this regime are the same as the STS’s: 
 Cash accounting: Using cash receipts and payments to determine taxable income; 
 Simpler depreciation: An instant write off for assets up to a certain cost, while all 
assets are pooled with other similar life assets and depreciated at a standard rate; 
and 
 Trading stock: Easier assessment for excess deductions or taxable income. 
4.3.2.3 Responses to the Small Business Entities Regime 
The impact of the new regime was expected to reduce the compliance costs of many 
small business entities because there is only one entry threshold to gain access to multiple 
concessions (Costello, 2007). However Kenny (2008) argues that the tax concessions 
from the SBE regime do not adequately offset the compliance costs for small businesses. 
As Kenny explains, the threshold for entry, when considering aggregated or ‘grouped’ 
entities this is because special rules apply with different levels of control over an entity. 
The rules were extensive (62 paragraphs of explanation) which may prove difficult and 
time consuming for small businesses to understand. Simplified prepaid expenses allow a 
business to deduct a prepayment if the service period is 12 months or less, and while it 
does provide small businesses with a timing benefit, there does not appear to be any 
significant simplification benefits. This concession contradicts the accounting principles 
that require expenses to be recognised in the period to which they relate. Compliance 
costs may increase, as taxpayers would need to adjust their accounting records for the 
immediate deduction. 
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The main criticism of the simplified depreciation method is that the benefits are limited to 
businesses with high levels of depreciable assets, and the inflexibility and complexity 
associated with leaving the SBE regime. Similar to the STS, when leaving the SBE 
regime, this requires the taxpayer to depreciate their pooled assets under the SBE rules, 
while new assets will be depreciated under standard rules. This leads to increased 
compliance costs from a record keeping perspective, as SBE taxpayers need to maintain 
two distinct capital allowance systems. Finally, the simplified trading stock concession 
received similar criticisms when it was implemented in the STS. Overall, Kenny (2007) 
finds that the new SBE regime has not addressed the major problems of the STS, and thus 
the SBE does not reduce compliance costs any more than the STS.  
Marsden et al (2013) found evidence to support Kenny’s (2007) claims, as the authors 
studied whether tax practitioners recommended the concessions from the SBE regime for 
their clients, and if so, for what purpose. The findings highlight that the SBE regime does 
not reduce compliance costs for small business, and that practitioners generally 
recommend specific concessions to obtain tax savings for their clients. Simplified trading 
stock was among the least beneficial according to tax practitioners, as no practitioner 
advised their clients to use it. The general comment from the tax practitioners was that, 
“in order to determine whether the value of closing stock exceeded the value of opening 
stock by more than AUD$5,000 [$5,350], a business was required to conduct a stocktake, 
which defeats the purpose and intent of the legislation” (Marsden et al. 2013, p. 11). 
Furthermore, the interviewees (tax practitioners) believed that the introduction of the SBE 
regime, in fact, increased the compliance costs due to the increased workload and 
education of clients. In addition, the majority of the interviewees stated that their primary 
motivation for adopting SBE concessions were to minimise tax, which is a concern for 
policymakers because the tax law is not achieving its purpose of greater simplicity and 
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reduced compliance costs. Future policy changes therefore should be made to for the STS 
SBE achieve its original intention. 
4.4 South Africa 
South Africa has developed two different approaches to tax micro and small to medium 
sized businesses. Similar to New Zealand, they have a system for micro business, as well 
as a separate system for small business companies. The Davis Tax Committee (DTC) 
(2014) explains that, since 2001, the National Treasury and South African Revenue 
Service (SARS)
44
 have attempted to incentivise the ‘missing middle’ through concessions 
using the Small Business Corporation (SBC) concept, as defined in Section 12E of the 
Income Tax Act 1962 (in ITA South Africa). They describe the ‘missing middle’ as 
entrepreneurial businesses with growth potential, as shown in Diagram 4. However, the 
problem faced in South Africa is that the level of entrepreneurial activity is about half of 
what is reported in other developing countries. This may be attributable to the extensive 
regulation imposed on those businesses, which create costly compliance costs for small 
businesses, while providing minimal compliance benefits. The primary objectives of these 
regimes is to creates an environment for these enterprises to grow, expand their 
operations and create more employment opportunities, while providing conditions to 
encourage new entrepreneurs to enter the market. The following subsections describe the 
two different regimes. 
Figure 1: The ‘missing middle’ sector targeted by the regimes45 
                                                 
44
 South African Revenue Service, equivalent to the IRD of New Zealand. 
45
 Retrieved from the Davis Tax Committee Report. 
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4.4.1 Small Business Corporations 
This system of concessions is targeted towards taxpayers that trade using company 
structures, mainly those in the ‘missing middle’, as these businesses present growth 
potential. As stated above, the primary purpose of the regime is to create an environment 
for businesses to grow and expand by minimising the costs of compliance, which 
increases the employment market.  
4.4.1.1 Entry Thresholds 
At the inception of the SBC regime in 2001, businesses must be in the formation of a 
close corporation, co-operative or any private company, as defined in the South African 
Companies Act 2008, in order to enter. As such, this regime excludes sole traders, 
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partnerships and trusts. Professional Accounting & Tax Consultants (2013) describe the 
entry rules, as legislated in Section 12E of the ITA 1963, to qualify as an SBC are as 
follows: 
1. All shareholders or members are natural persons; 
2. All shareholders hold no shares in any other private company; 
3. All members hold no members’ interest in any other Close Corporation; 
4. Gross income for the year of assessment does not exceed R14 million 
[$1,540,000]; and 
5. Not more than 20 per cent of the gross income and all the capital gains consist 
collectively of investment income and income rendering a personal service. 
The DTC stated that the gross income threshold have been increased from R14 million 
[$1,540,000] to R20 million [$2,200,000], effective from the 2014 year of assessment. 
There are businesses outside the R20 million gross income threshold that are within the 
‘breakeven’ category, the DTC suggests that an increase to R50 million [$5,500,000] 
would capture these businesses. Heavy restrictions relating to shareholding and 
professional service businesses are included to prevent abuse of the concessions. While 
entry thresholds into the system are widely explained, it is unclear whether businesses 
will be removed from the SBC regime if they exceed the R20 million turnover in the 
preceding tax year. However, an SBC will be removed if any of the ownership rules are 
breached.  
4.4.1.2 Concessions Offered 
The SBC regime offers tax reductions and simpler depreciation. Companies that are 
eligible as an SBC will not be taxed at the normal flat company tax rate of 28 per cent; 
instead, a progressive tax rate is applied. The progressive rates are favourable compared 
56 
 
to the company flat tax rate. Professional Accounting & Tax Consultants (2013), 
Moneyweb (2012) and the DTC, present information related to the progressive tax rates 
available for SBCs. It appears that the progressive rates and brackets are changed yearly. 
The tables below will show the rates for the financial years 2013 and 2015.  
Table 7: SBC progressive tax rates for year 2012-13 
Taxable Income Tax Rate 
0 – R59,750 
[0 - $6,572] 
0% 
R59,751 – R300,000 
[$6,572 - $33,000] 
10% 
R300,001 + 
[$33,000 +] 
28% 
Table 8: SBC progressive tax rates for year 2014-15 
Taxable Income Tax Rate 
0 – R70,700 
[0 - $7,777] 
0% 
R70,701 – R365,000 
[$7,777 - $40,150] 
7% 
R365,001 – R550,000 
[$40,150 - $60,500] 
21% 
R550,001 + 
[$60,500 +] 
28% 
Comparing the two tables, we can see that the rates have become more favourable for 
SBCs in the year 2014-15. Comparing the lowest brackets from 0 – R59,750 in 2012, to 0 
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– R70,700 in 2014, the upper bracket has increased to allow a higher amount of untaxed 
income. Furthermore, the highest bracket of income to be taxed at 28 per cent, has also 
risen from R300,001 to R550,001, which further lowers the amount of income tax on 
those businesses between those turnovers. This has been a trend since the introduction of 
this system, as the lowest bracket for 0 per cent tax for the year ending 2011 was 0 – 
R57,000 (Professional Accounting & Tax Consultants, 2013). This concession 
considerably reduces the amount of income tax payable for SBCs compared to ineligible 
companies paying a flat rate of 28 per cent on all company income.  
Another major concession offered to SBCs is a special depreciation deduction for assets. 
Professional Accounting & Tax Consultants (2013) explain that the full cost of any asset 
purchased for the purpose of manufacture and brought into use for the first time on or 
after 1 April 2001, may have its full costs deducted in the tax year in which it relates to. 
As for all other depreciable assets, from 1 April 2005, they can be written off on a 
50:30:20. In basis other words, for the year that the asset was purchased 50 per cent can 
be deducted, the next two years following that 30 per cent, and 20 per cent can be 
deducted each tier, respectively. There appears to be an emphasis on manufacturing 
equipment, which suggests easing the burden more on manufacturing businesses than 
others.  
The key concessions from the SBC regime: 
 Different tax rates: Businesses are able to calculate their income tax with a 
separate progressive tax system; and 
 Simpler depreciation: An instant write-off for manufacturing equipment and 
percentage write-off for all other depreciable assets. 
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4.4.1.3 Reponses to the Small Business Corporations Regime 
The DTC has evaluated the most recent version of the SBC regime and found some 
fundamental issues with its design. The DTC found that the system does not provide any 
relief for businesses with no taxable income. Statistics
46
 gathered by SARS finds that 
40,633 of the 86,333 (47%) active SBC population earn no taxable income. The DTC 
argue that these businesses receive no incentives, and that they need as much financial 
intervention from the government, if not more, than SBCs liable to tax. The DTC states, 
“Of crucial importance is that the tax compliance burden is a factor of the size of the 
business, not the actual tax liability” (Davis Tax Committee, 2014, p. 17). Following from 
that, the DTC also found that the incentives are mainly beneficial for SBCs with high 
taxable incomes. The statistics suggest that of the 45,670 taxable SBCs, there are 12,658 
with the sectors of financial services and insurance, and the medical profession, which 
collectively enjoy R387 million [$42,570,000] of the total R1.36 billion [$149,600,000] 
(24%) SBC incentive. The DTC question whether these types of businesses were intended 
to receive the SBC incentive.  
Furthermore, the DTC find that the costs to administer the SBC tax incentive for business 
is expensive, especially since professionals are advocating its use for their clients to 
increase their fees. Not only do the entry thresholds require accounting data, but also 
calculation of the SBC’s taxable income becomes harder than it would have, than if they 
continued to use a simple flat company tax rate. Finally, the DTC criticise the complexity 
of the SBC definition that was designed to prevent abuse of the system. The rules 
regarding ownership in other companies can be onerous, and the DTC suggests that these 
rules should be reassessed and simplified.  
                                                 
46
 SARS ‘Tax Statistics’ 2013. 
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Timm (2013, p. 1) describes the SBC regime as one of “the most generous tax breaks on 
offer for small and micro businesses, but they remain grossly unused”. Timm explains 
that by the end of the 2012 financial year, only about 90,000 businesses received a tax 
break as an SBC (from approximately 110,000 companies that applied), despite having 
over 2 million registered companies with SARS. Timm speculates that the low take-up 
rate may be due to poor marketing of the tax breaks or the onerous criteria a business 
needs to meet to qualify. This view is consistent with the DTC’s and it is quite possible 
that the entry criteria may be the cause of such low take-up rates.  
4.4.2 Micro Business Turnover Tax 
South Africa has created a regime to help lower the compliance costs, as well as provide a 
tax break for the smallest businesses. Entry into this regime is highly monitored by SARS 
to avoid misuse of the system. ‘Survivalist businesses’, referred to in Figure 1, are the 
target for this regime. These businesses are described as mainly home-based business or 
ones that operate ‘on the streets’, for example street vendors. Typically these businesses 
lack capital equipment, operate predominantly in cash, while maintaining, at best, basic 
financial records. Such businesses include, but are not limited to, taxi operators, taverns, 
casual construction workers and gardeners (DTC, 2014).  
4.4.2.1 Entry Thresholds 
In order to be eligible for the concessions offered in the micro business regime, the 
turnover of a natural person or company must not exceed R1 million [$110,000] per 
annum. In addition to the turnover threshold, income from professional services cannot 
exceed 20 per cent of the total business income, and the proceeds from the disposal of 
capital assets may not exceed R1.5 million [$165,000], in the current and immediately 
preceding two years. This regime is not limited to company-structured businesses, so sole 
60 
 
traders and partnerships can be eligible, hence, the system is not limited to companies. As 
expected, the regime has been designed for the smallest businesses, and various measures 
have been put in place to prevent unwarranted users.  
4.4.2.2 Concessions Offered 
Being eligible to enter the micro business regime enables a business to calculate their 
income tax on a progressive turnover basis. The current rates for the 2014-15 year are as 
follows: 
Table 9: Micro Business progressive turnover tax rates for year 2014-15 
Taxable Turnover Tax Rate 
0 – R150,000 
[0 - $16,500] 
0% 
R150,001 – R300,000 
[$16,500 - $33,000] 
1% 
R300,001 – R500,000 
[$33,000 - $55,000] 
2% 
R500,001 – R750,000 
[$55,000 - $82,500] 
4% 
R750,001 + 
[$82,500 +] 
6% 
The rates are considerably lower than compared to income tax rates because turnover will 
be used to determine liability, rather than profit. At this stage, there are no other 
concessions offered to micro businesses. 
The key concession of this regime is a Different tax rate: Where businesses are able to 
calculate their income tax liability using a progressive turnover tax. 
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4.4.2.3 Responses Received on the Micro Business Turnover Tax Regime 
The DTC (2014) evaluated the current micro business regime. The system was designed 
to capture some businesses that have not previously paid their taxes, which is similar to 
the 2009 proposed system in New Zealand, to allow those that have operated mainly in 
‘under-the-table’ dealings to join the simplified system without penalty from past 
activities. However, the DTC questions whether businesses, who in the past have not paid 
taxes, would wish to the cost of complying with tax law to register for a new simple tax 
system. Another issue discovered by the DTC is that the micro regime does not promote 
growth, because businesses will become ineligible once they exceed the exemption 
thresholds. This creates an incentive for taxpayers to keep business income below the 
threshold. Finally, the DTC (2014) and Timm (2013) both agree that the take-up rate of 
the regime is considerably low, as by the end of the 2012 year only 8,493 businesses were 
registered as micro. 
Moneyweb (2012) provides some evidence as to why businesses may not wish to register 
as a micro business. One thing that may be undesirable for potential micro business 
taxpayers is that turnover tax, while it has much lower rates, must be paid regardless of 
whether a profit is made. Moneyweb (2012, p. 1) advises, “as a rule of thumb, if you have 
big, healthy margins, turnover tax could work for you, however if your margins are 
generally tighter, you’re probably better off using the SBC concession’. This could 
explain some of the disparity in numbers registered in the micro regime compared to the 
SBC regime. 
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4.5 The United Kingdom 
The UK has recently approved adoption of a simplification scheme for small businesses. 
Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs (HMRC), the UK Revenue authority, appointed the 
newly created Office of Tax Simplification (OTS) to carry out a review on small business 
taxation in 2010 (HM Treasury & OTS, 2010). In February 2012, the OTS provided 
recommendations for simplifying the tax administration for small business in their final 
report (Office of Tax Simplification, 2012). The focus of the recommendations was on 
the smallest businesses, as past research has shown that compliance costs regressively 
affect businesses, due to the fact all businesses (from sole traders and partnerships to 
multinational corporations) have to use the same rules to work out their trading profits. 
Subsequently, the UK government introduced a separate regime for the smallest 
businesses, known as ‘Simpler Income Tax for the Simplest Small Business” in 2013. 
The following sections discuss the entry requirements and the concessions that the regime 
offers.  
4.5.1 Simpler Income Tax for the Simplest Small Business 
This regime was introduced by the UK Finance Bill 2013, which amends and adds several 
sections in the Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005 (ITTOIA). The regime 
intends to create a complex-free tax system for smaller businesses to comply with their 
income tax obligations. 
4.5.1.1 Entry Thresholds 
During the proposal phase of the regime in 2012, the focus of the recommendations was 
for the smallest businesses to be the focus, more specifically, those with a turnover 
£30,000 [$62,100] or lower, with little or no significant capital investment, who are 
normally not registered VAT, and with no employees. As explained above, HMRC 
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appointed the OTS to review the proposed regime, and in 2013, the final report by the 
OTS recommended some changes, which were approved and subsequently implemented 
through the Finance Bill. The entry turnover thresholds were increased from the initial 
recommendation of £30,000 to £77,000 [$159,390] and double that (£154,000) 
[$318,780] for those in receipt of the Universal Credit.
47
 In addition to the turnover 
requirement, businesses cannot be incorporated, so they must operate as either a sole 
trader or in a partnership. 
The entry threshold was increased to be in line with the VAT registration rate. The OTS 
wanted to keep the threshold at a ‘familiar boundary’ in the tax system (HM Revenue & 
Customs, 2012a). The consequence of the increased threshold means that more businesses 
are eligible for the regime. Since the implementation of the regime in 2013, the VAT 
registration rate has increased to £79,000 [$163,530] (due to inflation) from 1 April 2013, 
which also increases the threshold for the small business tax regime. For the year 2014-
15, the VAT registration rate has risen to £81,000 [$167,670], which means that the 
regime turnover threshold also increased to this a level (HM Revenue & Customs, 2014). 
Table 10: Turnover levels to enter or be disqualified the regime 
Entry turnover to qualify must be less than £81,000 
Exit turnover to be disqualified must be more than £162,000 
Furthermore, the OTS also recognised that there are transitional issues as businesses 
grow. Thus the regime allows qualified businesses to grow up to twice the turnover 
threshold rate (£162,000) [$335,340], at which point the business must exit the regime 
and revert back to standard rules (as shown on Table 10).  
                                                 
47
 The Universal credit is a new welfare benefit set up for people who are looking for work or on a low 
income. Retrieved from: https://www.gov.uk/ment/policies/simplifying-the-welfare-system-and -making-
sure-work-pays/supporting-pages/introducing-universal-credit.  
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4.5.1.2 Concessions Offered 
Organisations eligible for the regime will be allowed to use the cash basis and simplified 
expenses to calculate their taxable income. Section 25A Cash Basis for Small Businesses 
has been added to the ITTOIA 2005, which provide the rules regarding the use of the cash 
basis to determine taxable income. Using the cash basis to calculate profits removes the 
need to report in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). 
However, businesses can choose to continue using GAAP, as the cash basis is an optional 
concession (HM Revenue & Customs, 2012b). Reported losses can only be carried 
forward. Furthermore, users opting to use the cash basis will no longer be required to 
revalue their trading stock to market value, which removes the burden for businesses of 
determining the market value and then having to subsequently adjust it.  
Simplified expenses are available to both eligible businesses and ineligible 
unincorporated businesses.
48
 The simplification of expenses applies to expenditure on 
vehicles, use of homes for business purposes, and use of premises used for both home and 
business purposes. The concession allows the business to calculate these types of 
expenditure using a simple flat rate, rather than a potentially tedious and complex 
appointment of actual expenditure. The purpose of the provision is to reduce the 
complexity in determining deductible expenditure for the particular year.  
Section 94E of the ITTOIA 2005 provides the rules for vehicle expenditure. The main 
aspect of this concession is that it allows businesses to calculate the allowable 
expenditure for each vehicle using the mileage used. For cars and goods vehicles, a 
progressive flat rate system will be used, whereas motorcycles will only have a single flat 
                                                 
48
 It should be noted that the entry thresholds were mainly devised for those entering the cash basis, while 
simplified expense concessions may apply to any non-company structured businesses.  
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rate for mileage used. Restrictions are placed on those vehicles that have previously 
claimed capital allowances. The rates are set out on Table 11. 
Table 11: Simplified motor vehicles expenditure rate 
Vehicle Flat rate per mile 
Cars and goods vehicles first 10,000 miles 45p [$0.93] 
Cars and goods vehicles after 10,000 miles 25p [$0.51] 
Motorcycles 24p [$0.49] 
Section 94H ITTOIA 2005 sets the rules for a standard deduction for businesses that use a 
home for business purposes. The allowable amount will be based on the number of hours 
spent per month. Alternatively, businesses can choose to claim any allowable portion of 
actual expenses. Businesses may only use these rates if they spend at least 25 hours per 
month working from home. It should be noted that telephone and internet expenses are 
not covered in this flat rate, but a business can claim a proportion of these costs by 
working out the actual costs. The rates are shown in the following table. 
Table 12: Standard deduction rate for working at home 
Number of business use per month Flat rate per month 
25-50 £10 [$20.70] 
51-100 £18 [$37.26] 
101 + £26 [$53.82] 
Section 94I ITTOIA provides the rules for businesses that use a portion of their personal 
home as business premises. An adjustment can be made for the number of private 
occupants using their premises per month. The business will need to determine the total 
amount of the expenses incurred in the house and then subtract the amount for personal 
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use (based on the number of people living on the premises), and that amount can be 
claimed. By using this method to determine the appropriate deduction, the business owner 
will not need to tediously calculate the split between personal and private use. The 
following table presents the amounts that can be claimed. 
Table 13: Standard rate for private use of the premises 
Number of people Flat rate per month 
1 £350 [$724] 
2 £500 [$1,035] 
3 + £650 [$1,345] 
The concessions offered are optional, so at no point will it require businesses to change 
established methods of expenditure reporting. So, similar to the updated Australian 
regime, businesses may ‘pick and choose’ the concessions that are relevant for them. 
There is one exception to this. If a business chooses to use the cash accounting, they must 
also use fixed-rate motoring expenses. Overall, the regime provides alternative options 
for small businesses to calculate their taxable income with greater certainty (HM Revenue 
& Customs, 2012b).  
The key concessions of this regime are: 
 Cash accounting: Eligible businesses will be able to calculate their taxable income 
on a payments and receipts basis; 
 Simpler Depreciation: Calculating the depreciation for vehicles with a standard 
rate based on mileage used; and 
 Home office deductions: Standard rates will be applied across the board for home 
office deductions. There is also separation of private and business use. 
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4.5.1.3 Responses received on the Simplest Income Tax for the Simplest Small 
Businesses Regime 
The regime underwent its first change in 1 April 2013. The UK Government implemented 
an amendment to the original concessions, which removed the mandatory use of fixed-
rate motoring expenses if cash accounting was used (AccountingWeb, 2013). The 
Association of Taxation Technicians (2013) (ATT) published a response by its President, 
Yvette Nunn:  
“We welcome in particular the abandonment of the mandatory use of fixed-rate motoring 
expenses which could have been a stumbling block for many potential users of the 
proposed scheme…it is also good to see that HMRC has listened to the advice from 
bodies like the ATT”.  
This suggests that practitioners and small businesses do not favour mandatory provisions 
in a simplification scheme, which is similar to the findings from the Australian 
experience. 
Economia (2013) published an online article which questions how simple a small 
business tax regmie really is. The author believes that the turnover threshold for the 
‘simplest small business’ is too high using the VAT registration rate, and even more so 
for recipients of Universal Credit. Further, the author questions the relevance of Universal 
Credit receivers and business size. The author criticises the optional aspect of the new 
rules because rather than simplifying the current tax rules, it further complicates the 
situation for the owner by giving them choices that will lead to confusion. For some 
businesses, the decision to use one system over another is obvious, while for others, it 
will require time-consuming calculations to determine which method is more worthwhile 
pursing. In addition, these calculations will be required each year in order for the business 
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to make informed decisions. The author concludes by stating that a better solution for tax 
simplification would be to define a set of clear tax rules applicable across the board 
without exception or variation, but the author doubts this can be achieved, due to fairness 
arguments.  
4.6 The United States 
The US takes a different approach to their small business concessions. There is no 
comprehensive regime specifically for smaller businesses; however, there are some 
targeted concessions, which is similar to New Zealand’s current practice. Most recently, 
the US has extended several small business tax incentives, with the intention of spurring 
innovation, supporting capital investment, and making it easier to hire new workers (U.S 
Small Business Administration, 2013) (SBA). This was made possible by passing of the 
American Taxpayer Relief Act 2012, which lead to subsequent amendments in the US 
Income Tax Code, most notably Section 179 Deductions, that allows small businesses to 
immediately deduct certain new and used property.  
Since there is no comprehensive regime for smaller businesses, there becomes an issue as 
to what attributes a small business. There does not appear to be a standardised definition 
adopted in the US. The SBA defines small businesses as any business with less than 500 
employees (Nazar, 2013). However, this description of a small business is rarely used, 
especially when determining whether a concession is for a ‘small business’. Most tax 
concessions will come with different eligibility criteria, so in this section, a list of 
concessions, mainly focused towards smaller businesses, is discussed.
49
 
                                                 
49
 Not all concessions will be relevant outside of the US, so concessions that could be applicable in New 
Zealand will be considered in this section. 
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4.6.1 Key Concessions Offered 
4.6.1.1 Simpler Depreciation 
The signing of the American Taxpayer Relief Act 2012 extended the deduction for certain 
property up to USD$500,000
50
 for the 2012-13 tax years. Businesses that are considered 
eligible, or in essence ‘small’, must have under USD$2 million51 in qualifying 
expenditures. The concession allows eligible businesses to deduct, in some cases, the 
entire cost of any qualifying asset in the year that it was purchased, rather than depreciate 
the cost over time. In addition, ‘bonus’ depreciation allows business owners to depreciate 
50 per cent of the cost of new equipment purchased in 2014. Both tax incentives can be 
used concurrently. 
4.6.1.2 Start-Up Costs/Pre-Trade Deductions 
This concession is not designed specifically for small business, but its design and purpose 
suits smaller businesses. The concessions allows a business to deduct up to USD$5,000 
[$6,850] of start-up costs incurred before operations begin, in the first year of business 
(Weltman, 2014). Where the costs exceed USD$5,000 but is under USD$50,000 
[$68,500], the business can amortise these costs over a period of 15 years. There are some 
special rules and conditions for those costs that exceed USD$50,000 to be deducted in the 
future. While this concession is not limited to those under the ‘small business’ definition, 
the conditions are set low enough that it restricts the ‘usefulness’ of these deductions for 
larger start-ups.  
                                                 
50
 Figures are shown in US dollars which with the current exchange rate NZD$1 = USD$0.85, would be 
NZD$588,235 as at 4 June 2014. 
51
 Figures are shown in US dollars which with the current exchange rate NZD$1 = USD$0.85, would be 
NZD$2,352,941 as at 4 June 2014. 
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4.6.1.3 Home Office Deductions 
Again, the following concession is not limited for small businesses, but is targeted 
towards smaller businesses. This concession allows businesses that operate principally 
from home, or have dedicated workspaces at home, to deduct a portion of expenditure 
incurred (Weltman, 2014). These costs include, but are not limited to, rent, mortgage, 
insurance, electricity and housekeeping. The deduction requires the taxpayer to measure 
the work area used as a percentage of the total home space, and from there the 
expenditure can be apportioned. However, from the 2013 tax year, taxpayers will have the 
option to use a simplified method of determining the home office deduction (Neal, 2013). 
A simplified rate of USD$5
52
 per square foot of home (with a maximum of 300 square 
feet claimable) that’s used for the business purposes is deductible, instead of having to 
calculate the total square diameters of the house and then take a percentage of the total 
expenditure incurred as a deduction. This method of calculation eases the amount of 
measuring required. 
4.6.1.4 Cell Phone Deduction 
As cell phones are more commonly used than landlines (Neal, 2013), a deduction is 
allowed for the portion used for business use. The concession requires the business to 
distinguish and separate business from private use, so a portion can be deducted. Again, 
this concession is not specific for small businesses, as there are no barriers of entry. 
Key concessions offered to small businesses: 
 Simpler depreciation: Businesses can deduct a certain amount of capital asset 
purchases; 
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 Figures are shown in US dollars which with the current exchange rate NZD$1 = USD$0.85, would be 
NZD$5.88 as at 4 June 2014. 
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 Start-Up and pre-trade deductions: Start-up businesses can deduct up to a certain 
amount for start-up expenses; 
 Home office deduction: A simplified rate can be used to deduct an amount of 
expenditure incurred in a private home; and 
 Cell phone deduction: Some businesses use cell phones more than landlines. A 
deduction will be available if it can be separated between private and business use. 
These are the concessions currently available to most businesses (that has some relevance 
outside of the US), but with an emphasis on small, start-up businesses. However, 
President Obama intended to introduce a more simplified system of tax incentives for 
small business owner in his 2013 Budget (Neal, 2013). However, developments of this 
regime could not be found by the researcher. Some of these concessions include removing 
capital gains on key investments, doubling the amount of pre-trade deductions to 
USD$10,000 [$13,700], and eliminating complicated depreciation schedules and 
simplifying tax returns by streamlining the home office deductions. 
4.7 Comparative Summary 
Throughout the review of each country’s concessionary regimes for small businesses, 
each has its own unique features, while maintaining a level of similarity with the 
concessions provided. This section provides a brief comparison of the different regimes, 
in particularly the barriers of entry and the concessions offered. 
4.7.1 Entry Thresholds 
This subsection will compare the entry criteria for each the regimes together. As the 
criteria of entry vary from country to country, an ‘x’ signifies criteria that are not relevant 
to the application of the regime. For the comparison, the latest version of each regime is 
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used for the analysis. Finally, as some countries have implemented two regimes, one for 
‘small businesses’ and another for ‘micro’, two tables will be used for the comparison. 
Table 14: The entry thresholds into each ‘Small Business’ regime 
 
Maximum Entry 
Turnover 
Number of 
Employees 
Exit Turnover 
Threshold 
New Zealand 
(Proposed) 
$600,000 x $840,000 
Australia 
AUD$2 million 
[$2,140,000] 
x x 
South Africa 
R20 million 
[$2,200,000] 
x x 
United 
Kingdom 
£81,000 
[$167,670] 
x 
£162,000 
[$335,340] 
United States x Less than 500 x 
Looking at the maximum entry turnover, it is clear that, aside from the US, in New 
Zealand dollar terms, the UK has the lowest entry turnover threshold cut-off at $158,823, 
compared to South Africa being the highest at $2,200,000, and Australia a little lower at 
$2,140,002. When looking at the exit turnover thresholds, it is interesting to observe that 
the two lowest maximum entry threshold countries have an exit threshold that is different 
to the entry one, providing an opportunity for businesses to grow before having to revert 
back to normal rules. The US is different to the other countries, in that it does not have a 
comprehensive regime into and the concessions can be accessed by most businesses, but 
are designed for smaller businesses. As stated above, the SBA considers businesses with 
less than 500 employees as being ‘small’, so that has been denoted the entry criteria for 
assessing the concessions offered. 
Table 15: The entry thresholds into each ‘Micro Business’ regime 
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 Maximum Entry 
Turnover 
Number of 
Employees 
Exit Turnover 
Threshold 
New Zealand 
(Proposed) 
$60,000 0 $84,000 
South Africa 
R1 million 
[$110,000] 
x x 
The only countries that offer or propose a separate regime to micro businesses are South 
Africa and New Zealand. Both entry turnovers are not particularly high, with South 
Africa slightly higher at just over $100,000. Micro businesses in New Zealand would be 
allowed to have any employees, whereas South Africa has no restriction. Finally, the 
proposed regime for New Zealand includes an exit threshold that is different to its entry 
threshold, which allows for fluctuations in turnover without a business being removed 
from the regime. South Africa has not included such a provision in their thresholds. 
4.7.2 Concessions Offered 
This section groups together and compares the small business tax concessions offered. 
This list will then be used for the interviews with the tax professionals. A comparison of 
the concessions offered from each country is shown in the following table. A distinction 
between the concessions offered in small or micro business regimes is not necessary, as 
the focus of this thesis is on exploring different possible concessions for small business in 
general. Another important point is that the concession may be implemented differently in 
each country, but overall the effect intended to be achieved is the same. The table denotes 
“” as having the concession in the country’s regime, and an “x” means that no such 
concession is mentioned in the regime. There could, however, be provisions in each 
respective tax system that deals with certain concessions not mentioned with the regime.  
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Table 16: The tax concessions offered in each country’s regime 
 New 
Zealand 
Australia South 
Africa 
United 
Kingdom 
United 
States 
Cash Accounting   x  x 
Simpler 
Depreciation 
     
Trading Stock   x x x 
Different Tax Rates  x  x x 
Timing of Payments  x x x x 
Start-Up Deductions x x x x  
Cell phone 
Deductions 
x x x x  
Home Office 
Deductions 
x x x   
Table 16 shows that all regimes include a concession for simpler depreciation, which 
could mean that accounting for depreciation is a major contributor in the compliance 
costs faced by small businesses. The next most used concession is allowing businesses to 
calculate their income tax on a payments and receipts basis, rather than using accrual 
acounting. New Zealand can be seen to have the most concessions offered to eligible 
taxpayers, but this may be due to the fact that it is at this stage point only a proposal and 
has not been implemented. In contrast, South Africa offers the least amount of 
concessions to its eligible taxpayers, with only simpler depreciation and the use of a 
different tax rate. The US offers deductions that most countries do not, which raises the 
question; whether these deductions help businesses reduce their compliance costs for 
small businesses. Overall, these concessions are currently available to small businesses, 
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with the exception of New Zealand, to help reduce the compliance costs of taxation. This 
answers the first research question:  
RQ1. What tax regimes are currently in place (or proposed) for small businesses, in a 
group of selected countries, to reduce the tax compliance burden of these businesses? 
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Chapter 5: Interview Findings 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the interview findings with a number of tax professionals in New 
Zealand. The purpose of the interview, as explained in Chapter 3, was to gauge the 
opinions and ideas on the viability for New Zealand small businesses on the concessions 
gathered in Chapter 4, in order to answer the second research question: 
RQ2. Of the tax regimes (and specific provisions) implemented or proposed in these 
selected countries, which of them, if implemented, could be expected to reduce the 
compliance costs of taxation for small businesses in New Zealand? 
The findings are presented in two main parts: the first reviews the tax concessions, 
summarised in 4.7.2 and whether it could be expected they may reduce compliance costs 
in New Zealand; the second focuses on other important aspects to consider when 
designing a small business tax regime. The discussion is focused on the tax professionals' 
perceptions from their experience with the New Zealand tax system, and their particular 
expertise with smaller businesses. 
5.2 Participants 
As explained in Chapter 3, ‘tax professionals’ is defined in this thesis as individuals with 
many years of experience working in tax in New Zealand. Further, tax professionals are 
recruited on the basis of their working experience and interest with small businesses. 
Following the preliminary research to find suitable participants, ten invitations were sent 
out via email to gauge interest. At the beginning of the interview process seven tax 
professionals responded, indicating their interest to participate in the interview. However, 
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one did not respond to subsequent emails, resulting in a final number of six participants 
for the interviews. The selected participants worked in various small to medium sized 
accounting firms, and members from various tax advisory organisations that held 
managerial or higher positions. This thesis has two participants in each category: Small 
Accounting Firms, Medium Accounting Firms, and Tax Advisory Organisations. Of the 
six participants, five were male and one female. Furthermore, the geographic location of 
each participant varies over the country, with five were interviewed over the phone and 
one face-to-face. The interviews were conducted between November 2014 and January 
2015.  
Table 17: Demographics of interview participants 
Type of Tax Professional Gender Interview Method Reference in the Thesis 
Medium Accounting Firm Male Phone Tax Professional A 
Tax Advisory Organisation Male Phone Tax Professional B 
Medium Accounting Firm Male Phone Tax Professional C 
Tax Advisory Organisation Male Phone Tax Professional D 
Small Accounting Firm Male Face-to-Face Tax Professional E 
Small Accounting Firm Female Phone Tax Professional F 
5.3 Interview Findings 
The following sections analyse the interview information to provide insights as to how a 
small business regime should be designed, while considering important issues that may 
arise. First, the concessions, outlined in 4.7.2, are discussed, and then other issues, 
brought up in the interviews, are discussed. 
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5.3.1 Tax Concessions for a Regime in New Zealand 
The interview participants were given a list of concessions similar to section Chapter 4, 
Table 16, to review prior to the beginning of the interview. The participants were given 
an opportunity to share their thoughts on each concession. The following section will 
present key themes arising from the responses given. 
5.3.1.1 Cash Accounting 
As a whole, the concession allowing small businesses to calculate their income tax on a 
cash basis was generally accepted among the respondents as being useful. The general 
understanding is that it removes the need for time-consuming calculations related to 
accrual accounting. As a result, this reduces the amount of time spent by small businesses 
dealing with accounting calculations. Some suggested that using the cash accounting 
basis could be linked with the current GST system in New Zealand. Combining the GST 
and income tax return on a cash basis could lead to be better management of cash flow, as 
tax payments are only made when cash is paid and received. Several comments were 
made on the cash accounting concession: 
“Probably the biggest one would be cash basis [referring to all 
concessions], if you would allow that for small business, it would take 
a lot of pressure off of small business…so this means that they can pay 
their taxes when they have the money”. 
(Tax Professional D, Tax Advisory Organisation) 
“Cash accounting – absolutely, you shouldn’t have anybody in a small 
business doing anything other than that…can you do it through GST 
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filing, so you can actually get away with them filing an income tax 
return altogether”. 
(Tax Professional A, Medium Accounting Firm) 
While all participants agreed that cash accounting would save time, one respondent 
believed that the time saved through implementing a cash basis would be minimal due to 
the availability of accounting software systems. Furthermore, businesses that already 
operate on an accruals basis would incur more compliance costs to restructure their 
business in order to take advantage of the concession. As Tretola (2007) explains, the 
cause of the initial low take-up rate of the STS was a result of the cash accounting rules 
being imposed on, established, accrual-based accounting businesses. As one interviewee 
commented: 
“Cash accounting is an interesting one, I find that in the sense that 
business software systems that capture revenue these days are getting 
more readily available, so a cash accounting system is almost the 
same, where full accounting is actually not too more expensive to 
administer than cash accounting…we might, by the margin, say cash 
accounting is simpler for a small business”. 
(Tax Professional C, Medium Accounting Firm) 
Another interesting argument arose, where the tax professional agreed that cash 
accounting, in the general sense, will save a little time, whereas removing the capital-
revenue distinction through the cash accounting system could save even more. This 
would inherently remove depreciation completely. However, this would lead to less 
80 
 
available information about the business, which could cause problems with internal and 
external decision making, as one interviewee commented: 
“…removing the income capital divide would save, a lot more time 
and money. Basically they wouldn’t need an accountant anymore, 
because a lot of what we do is distinguish between income and 
capital…there are other implications though because there are going 
to be other stakeholders involved, let’s say if somebody wanted to 
borrow money, the banks are going to be fairly interested in the 
performance of the business, but nobody will know". 
(Tax Professional E, Small Accounting Firm) 
Overall, cash accounting can help reduce the compliance costs of bookkeeping for some 
businesses. Where businesses have established methods of accrual accounting, a cash 
accounting method could increase compliance costs. Implementing a cash accounting 
concession in a small business regime is indeed favourable, but it should not discourage 
good bookkeeping practice. Perhaps businesses that operate in accrual accounting should 
keep separate records for bookkeeping and tax purposes, but this would increase 
compliance costs. 
5.3.1.2 Simpler Depreciation 
All of the participants agreed that depreciation needed to be simplified for small 
businesses. The tax professionals favour the idea of increasing the $500 instant fixed asset 
write-off currently allowed in New Zealand.  
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“The depreciation, absolutely agree that the current write-off 
threshold of $500 is too low, so, you know [increasing it to] $1,000 is 
certainly a good step up”. 
(Tax Professional B, Tax Advisory Organisation) 
“Simpler depreciation, again, obvious, but it should be raised to [at 
least] $5,000, because that covers your laptops and all that other kind 
of stuff”. 
(Tax Professional F, Small Accounting Firm) 
It was agreed among most tax professionals that depreciation for small businesses is not 
sizeable enough to make a significant difference, even if the instant write-off threshold 
were increased. Another tax professional believed that depreciation should be removed 
completely from small business. As they comment: 
“Same with simpler depreciation [as well as standard depreciation], 
don’t do it. As a small business – who cares? And I’ve told this to the 
officials, as long as you’re not getting a deduction for a house or 
business premises, or cars, who cares about the rest”. 
(Tax Professional A, Medium Accounting Firm) 
As mentioned above with the cash accounting concession, removing the capital-revenue 
distinction would eliminate depreciation completely. This was another suggested method 
from one interviewee: 
“Simpler depreciation is probably a useful one, increasing write-offs 
is probably the best way to do it. [NZICA] suggested that in the end of 
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the [2009 NZICA small business proposal] that it was to be aligned 
with GST and income tax, so you’d write-off the asset to the portion of 
the business it was purchased in, up front, like cash flow basis”. 
(Tax Professional D, Tax Advisory Organisation) 
During the interviews, one tax professional brought up a key point as to why there should 
be simplified methods of depreciation for small businesses: 
“…I think the depreciation regime has been around for a long time, I 
guess I can understand where the depreciation concept comes from, 
[to record] the declining of an asset’s productive use over time. But 
what benefit is it to a small business…with depreciation right now, we 
are having to decide what is an asset, furthermore, a fixed asset, and 
of course intangibles as well. Determining what [is] a fixed asset then 
determining what the appropriate depreciation rate [should be], all 
takes time…and with the current tables, it’s not easy, it would be nice 
to get rid of it”. 
(Tax Professional E, Small Accounting Firm) 
Overall, the interviewees recommend that there needs to be inclusion of a simplified 
depreciation concession for small businesses. The cost of depreciation for small 
businesses is too high, without an equal or greater benefit of calculating it. The design of 
simpler depreciation methods would reflect more of the US and South African concession 
(immediate write-off) rather than the Australia and the UK (pooling all assets and 
depreciating at a standard rate). Therefore, if a regime is to be implemented in New 
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Zealand, it needs to either increase the immediate fixed asset write-off threshold or 
remove it completely with the cash basis, in order to reduce the compliance costs.  
5.3.1.3 Trading Stock 
This concession removes the need for small businesses to conduct yearly stocktakes. The 
responses for this concession varied across the interivewees. Two of the six tax 
professionals agreed that it would be merely a timing issue, with one tax professional 
believing that not undertaking a yearly stocktake can heavily impact on year to year 
results. The remainder did not see much of an impact with the current rules in place. 
Some comments made are: 
“Trading stock is one of those things that the Revenue 
[authority] will always say, ‘well how big is the trading stock?’ 
which is only timing, so who cares, it’s just shifting profit from 
one year to another”. 
(Tax Professional F, Small Accounting Firm) 
“…but the one I have the most issues with is probably the 
trading stock, simply because it can have such a material 
impact on year to year results. And to leave trading stock out 
of your calculations, will result in significant manipulation”. 
(Tax Professional B, Tax Advisory Organisation) 
“Removal of stocktakes, in a practical sense, it already 
happens, okay we’ve got that $5,000 exemption, so those don’t 
do stocktakes, but to be quite honest, the average corner dairy, 
doesn’t do a stocktake at the end of the year…a very large 
84 
 
number of businesses do not actually do stocktakes…[doing a 
stocktake] it’s not too hard to do if you set up for it, couple of 
businesses that actually do stocktakes, have barcode scanners 
and just go round and read the numbers and put the quantities 
and it’s not that hard, but businesses just don’t get into it 
because it costs more money…I’m not certain, removing it 
wouldn’t make much difference, keeping in there, it’s probably 
about good business than tax”. 
(Tax Professional E, Small Accounting Firm) 
“If you bring on a cash basis, you don’t have to keep these 
sorts of reports because you just have purchases, and if you 
pay for it, its deductible, and you don’t worry about anything, 
so that works quite nicely”. 
(Tax Professional D, Tax Advisory Organisation) 
As explained by one tax professional, a lot of businesses do not do the yearly stocktake, 
which suggests that the rules need to be further simplified. This is particularly important, 
as one interviewee explained leaving trading stock out of the calculations could lead to 
manipulation. However, the rules for simplified trading stock calculations need to be 
designed with the intention of reducing compliance costs, because McKerchar (2007) 
explained, for the Australian regime, that there appears to be little scope in reducing the 
compliance costs with respect to trading stock. 
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5.3.1.4 Different Tax Rates 
The idea of having different tax rates is to simplify the tax calculation by giving eligible 
businesses a low flat rate on their income or via some other measure (turnover or gross 
profit). As mentioned above, in Chapter 4, New Zealand’s proposal regime and South 
Africa’s regime for micro businesses include a low flat turnover tax, which simplifies 
income tax calculations. The majority of the tax professionals agree with New Zealand’s 
proposed system (the 2012 proposal) of implementing a separate simplified income tax 
method for ‘micro businesses’.  
“What [NZICA] were trying to do [the 2012 proposal] with that micro 
stuff was for simplicity to determine what your tax was going to be…At 
the micro level, I think it’s quite important because at the end of the 
month, you need to calculate what level your income is aggregated to 
work out what tax is payable…you can still use a flat rate, as long as 
it’s on a net or gross approach”. 
(Tax Professional C, Medium Accounting Firm) 
“If you’re a micro business, let’s ignore everything other than 
turnover tax and actually have it as a relatively small number”. 
(Tax Professional A, Medium Accounting Firm) 
The 2012 proposals for New Zealand mentions different rates based on the type of 
business. So, if the micro business operates in primarily supplying goods, the rate would 
be 7 per cent, whereas, if a business primarily offered services, then the turnover tax 
would be 14 per cent. This is due to the extra costs incurred by retail business that do not 
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affect service providers. However, for simplicity reasons, one tax professional suggests 
that the rates should be the same. 
“With turnover tax, you would presumably have it at a higher rate [for 
service businesses], than those selling things on Trademe. However, I 
think you should simplify it and have it at the same rate. But you will 
have those earning income from services be underpaying and those 
from goods, potentially, overpaying. But because it’s so low, it’s not 
significant”. 
(Tax Professional F, Small Accounting Firm) 
There is less support for a similar, preferential rate, system for ‘small businesses’, such as 
South African’s SBC progressive tax. This is understandable from the following 
comment: 
“I think for micro its fine because they aren’t making a lot of money, 
but when you get up to small business, presumably, these people are 
making a living, so it’s a full time activity, so why would you tax them 
differently to a wage earner? So I would be inclined to give a flat rate 
simply for micro business to keep it simple”. 
(Tax Professional E, Small Accounting Firm) 
The overall finding for different tax rates is that such a structure should be implemented 
but only for ‘micro businesses’. This would greatly reduce the amount of calculations 
required to comply with the tax laws. These findings are consistent with the feedback 
received from the proposed New Zealand regime (New Zealand Institute of Chartered 
Accountants, 2012b). However, a preferential tax rate for small business can be seen as 
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unfair to those that work for a wage or salary, even if it does reduce compliance costs. A 
possible reason as to why South Africa can offer lower rates to ‘small business’, is that 
South Africa, as a developing country intends to stimulate the economy by reducing the 
amount of taxes levied on SBCs, so that such businesses can grow and in turn reduce 
unemployment levels. Consideration need to be made on the basis of what should be 
taxed (gross profit, turnover, or net profits) in order to determine the appropriate rate. 
Finally, if a net or gross value is chosen to be taxed, then it should be very clear as to 
what is deductible. 
5.3.1.5 Timing of Payments 
The timing of payments appears to link with cash accounting, as found in the above 
section. It appears that income tax returns could be filed at a more convenient time, for 
example at the same time as GST, if an overall cash basis was used, as GST is calculated 
on an payments basis. There appear to be two problems with filing income tax jointly 
with GST. The first is that social benefit and assistance taxes that need will also need to 
be paid on those dates, which could have an impact on cash flow. 
“[NZICA] were trying to look into having quarterly finals [4 major 
payment dates] for small business, but the big problem is that you get 
with your social assistance taxes, or benefits and trying to work them 
in, it’s a real problem around paying that and tax rates. So it makes it 
really difficult. 
(Tax Professional D, Tax Advisory Organisation) 
The other issue is that currently with the provisional tax system is that it is based on last 
year’s income and depending on whether you overpaid or underpaid, a taxpayer will 
receive interest or have to pay interest, respectively, on the difference. An interesting idea 
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brought up with the timing of payments, is why not calculate provisional tax on a monthly 
basis, remove the interest. A comment in this regard is presented here: 
“I mean, with modern software, we can get information every month if 
we wanted, if clients are using that software, but still in theory, we 
could get the information monthly…an option would be to calculate 
provisional on monthly income and getting rid of interest payments. 
But talking about compliance, we need to do that efficiently, it could 
be done with software we have, the up and coming software provider 
for SMEs…it would take nothing to grab their API and extract that 
data, once a month and calculate liability…so timing of payments 
could increase compliance costs, but make cash flow management 
easier”. 
(Tax Professional E, Small Accounting Firm) 
Overall, the timing of income tax payments could work well with GST using the cash 
basis. However, as mentioned above, applying social assistance taxes may have 
implications for cash flow. Another area that must be considered as well is the 
provisional tax system, is what would need to change to accommodate multiple payments 
per year. Further research will be necessary to determine whether paying income tax at 
the same time as GST adds to compliance costs, and what effect it has one cash flow 
management, as there are two conflicting arguments. 
5.3.1.6 Start-Up and Pre-Trade Deductions 
Expenses incurred before operations begin can be substantial, so it hoped that businesses 
can offset those costs against the first year of income (or subsequent years). Currently in 
New Zealand there is a $10,000 legal fees deduction. This deduction could be extended to 
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incorporate other expenses incurred as well. The majority of the participants believe that 
there should be some concessions related to pre-trade expenditure on top of the existing 
legal fees deduction. This could be increasing that limit and allowing other expenses, as 
one interviewee commented: 
“You know there’s a $10,000 threshold in New Zealand [to 
deduct legal fees], so for a small business $20,000 of 
professional fees is a lot, so that might be an easier way of just 
saying anything less than $20,000 just write it off, anything 
above you need to justify it”. 
(Tax Professional B, Tax Advisory Organisation) 
An interesting point was brought up about the pre-trade deduction, in that it would only 
be effective depending on when a person started their business. A comment as follows: 
“I’m not sure that it would improve compliance but it eases the 
compliance with a bit of cash flow. If you start your company in April, 
you’re not going to be paying tax until August the following year, so 
the claim is irrelevant to those trading in this period…if you started in 
January, then it would have an impact”. 
(Tax Professional E, Small Accounting Firm) 
Overall, there were no major objections from the interviewees against having pre-trade 
deductions as part of a small business tax regime. However, it does raise questions as to 
whether it is beneficial for reducing compliance costs. 
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5.3.1.7 Cell Phone Deductions 
Currently in New Zealand the cost of cell phone use for business purposes can be 
deducted, if the business owner can distinguish between business and private use. The 
majority of the responses given were to simplify this business and private distinction. 
Two of the six interviewees suggested a percentage a standard percentage to deduct, 
while others suggest a fixed figure or rate of use, as a simplified method of deducting 
expenditure. Some comments are presented below: 
“Cell phone deductions, I think you got to go, landlines back then 
were that you could deduct up to 50% of the total cost. So why don’t 
we just say 50% of your cell phone cost is for business, and that will 
be deductible… I think for a lot of people there is a blur between what 
is private and business”. 
(Tax Professional F, Small Accounting Firm) 
“Cell phones, laptops, those sorts of things, again, as long as they’ve 
got a primary purpose test, then that makes sense…say like $50 a 
week, you don’t have to justify that level, anything above that level, 
you’ll need to justify…in reality, I’ll just take a slightly lower than 
what it may have been, but I don’t have to muck around keeping copies 
of this, that and everything”. 
(Tax Professional B, Tax Advisory Organisation) 
“So, cell phone deductions, you are permitted you know as long as you 
can show business and private use. I mean the key issue there is, why 
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put somebody there whose small business to the extra expense of 
trying to figure out what business and private is”. 
(Tax Professional A, Medium Accounting Firm) 
The comments made by the tax professionals give some suggestions as to how cell phone 
deductions could be structured. The key issue is to remove the need to distinguish 
between work and private use. This can be mitigated by setting a certain percentage of the 
costs as being deductible, or a standard rate of deduction, which would be considered fair 
for an average small business. More research is required to determine the best rate at 
which cell phone costs can be deducted. Furthermore, it was suggested that there should 
be standardised rules on the total communication expenses, which could include internet 
and cell phone expenses. This would be a positive impact on compliance costs. 
5.3.1.8 Home Office Deductions 
Home office expenses are similar to cell phone expenses, in that they can be deducted if 
the distinction can be made between business and private use. Similarly, the responses 
from the interviews advocate a simplified system for businesses for claiming these 
expenses. Some comments are presented here: 
“Same with home office deductions [referring to cell phone 
deductions], there’s a blur between private and business lives, so why 
don’t we just $2,000 or something, deduction when you know you’re 
going to do something from home…let’s simplify stuff, but appreciate 
there will be some unders and overs, but that’s okay because it’s not 
significant on the large scale of things”. 
(Tax Professional F, Small Accounting Firm) 
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“So your private home or device [cell phone] has a business element 
in it, and its recognising an amount, if that amount is reasonable, most 
people would be happy with it. If you set it to $500, you could sit there, 
it’s not even worth the effort, if you set it to $2,000 to $3,000 then, or 
something that’s reasonable, it actually recognises that a lot of small 
businesses are run out of people’s homes”. 
(Tax Professional D, Tax Advisory Organisation) 
Again, a concession to simplify the calculations required to deduct home office 
expenditure is favoured by the tax professionals. Overall, distinguishing between private 
and business use is a huge compliance cost for small businesses. Similarly with cell 
phone deductions, it is a matter of finding the best rate to allow businesses to identify a 
figure and deduct it from their income.  
5.3.2 Other Considerations 
This section will discuss other considerations that need to be made when designing a 
small business tax regime.  
5.3.2.1 What is a Small Business? 
One aspect of designing a small business tax regime is defining certain thresholds of entry 
into the regime, but more importantly, defining what is a ‘small business’, particularly for 
New Zealand. As explained in the previous chapters, New Zealand has not adopted a 
standard definition for ‘small businesses’. Defining who will be eligible for this regime is 
equally, if not more, important, than designing the concessions offered. All participants 
gave their thoughts on the matter, with their views presented in the table below. 
Table 18: Possible eligibility criteria into the small business regime 
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 Small Business Micro 
Tax Professional A $2 million - $3 million in turnover Under $60,000 in turnover 
Tax Professional B $1 million - $2 million in turnover Did not mention 
Tax Professional C $1 million - $2 million in turnover Under $60,000 in turnover 
Tax Professional D Under $600,000 in turnover or $2.5 
million 
Did not mention 
Tax Professional E Under $600,000 in turnover and/or less 
than 5 employees 
Under $100,000 in turnover 
Tax Professional F Under $1 million in turnover Link with GST threshold 
In terms of defining ‘small businesses’, the tax professionals’ responses did not differ 
significantly, where the lowest threshold point is $600,000 in turnover, and the highest 
threshold  being $3 million. The general comments received were that basing the decision 
solely on turnover could be problematic: 
“We started talking at about $2.5 million, which takes away most of 
the population of New Zealand Businesses…we settled with around 
$600,000 turnover per year, if you’re under that, you’re a small 
business. Those are reasonable sized business, but at about 2-3 million 
turnover, you could have a service station, or a large 
supermarket…Most businesses in New Zealand are small businesses, 
and I think that’s what you really need to look at”. 
(Tax Professional D, Tax Advisory Organisation) 
“I mean $3 million, that’s bandied around, I think what you need to do 
is statistical analysis in, what point in time do you get big enough that 
you start hiring an internal accountant, whether its turnover, 
profitability, employee numbers…a natural bright line will come in”. 
94 
 
(Tax Professional A, Medium Accounting Firm) 
Tax Professional E believes consideration should be given to the number of employees in 
the business, as they comment: 
“As for a small business threshold, I think $600,000 is a little thin, but 
I think, tie that in with employment and it would give you a better 
guide”. 
(Tax Professional E, Small Accounting Firm) 
An interesting point made was the GST thresholds operate in a tiered format, where the 
registration point is $60,000, and up to $2 million turnover the business may calculate 
GST on a cash basis. A similar approach could be taken with a small business tax regime, 
as one interviewee commented: 
“…look at the GST payments basis, the turnover [threshold] is set at 
$2 million, there is a number where a business gets big enough where 
it should be more sophisticated and that becomes your trigger point”. 
(Tax Professional A, Medium Accounting Firm) 
This leads onto the next category of small business taxpayers, namely ‘micro’ businesses. 
This concept exists in the South African regime and is introduced in the New Zealand 
proposals. General comments accepted the NZICA and TMNZ approach, tying this in 
with the GST registration threshold. While many agreed that $60,000 was sufficient, one 
respondent suggests that the thresholds need to be reviewed:  
“The problem with thresholds, is that it hasn’t been indexed in 
legislation, so the $60,000 threshold for GST registration has been 
95 
 
around since 1986, so after a while, the definition of the threshold 
becomes less meaningful…for a long time I have been proponent of 
actually having some sort of indexation, and now I will say that it 
shouldn’t be changed every year, but even 5 years, it would be 
worthwhile…perhaps be put up by the CPI or whatever would be a 
relevant measure”. 
(Tax Professional F, Small Accounting Firm) 
Another interesting idea brought up is considering simplicity over accuracy, where 
defining full definitions of who should be part of the regime adds complexity, even to 
enter the regime. Further, it is suggested that there be different thresholds for removing 
businesses from the regime, as businesses could be eligible one year and ineligible in the 
next. One interviewee commented: 
 “So you say, well look, a small business might be better defined by the 
number of employees and some other objective basis, that might give 
you a better answer, but at the end of the day, it’s not simple. 
Particularly, you can have a set of rules for these things and if you’ve 
got a business at the margin and it’s not going to be useful if one year 
they’re in, next year they’re out…We have to have this buffer zone”. 
 (Tax Professional C, Medium Accounting Firm) 
The interviews comments indicate that the entry thresholds, or more importantly, the 
definition of a small business, could be anywhere from $600,000 to $3 million. One 
method would be to align these thresholds with GST thresholds, but as suggested, there 
should be a review of the current GST thresholds. The UK reviews its VAT thresholds 
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yearly, which also means that the entry thresholds into the UK’s small business regimes 
constantly change. Designing the rules for the thresholds should be kept as simple as 
possible, so business owners can easily know if they are eligible or not. Finally, the exit 
thresholds should be materially different to the entry ones, to avoid potentially adding 
compliance costs to businesses sitting on the margins. 
5.3.2.2 Role of the Accountant 
Introducing a small business tax regime to simplify the tax system could see less work for 
accountants, as businesses will attempt doing more themselves. The general finding from 
the interviews is that the accountant can offer more to the business than simply tax 
compliance work. However, the introduction of a simplification regime does not mean all 
businesses will automatically become experts in calculating tax liabilities and filing tax 
returns. As a result of simpler methods, the time spent on tax compliance activities should 
shrink, and those that wish to do it themselves should find complying with the system less 
time consuming. Furthermore, those that continue to use an accountant for compliance 
purposes, should expect a lower cost incurred:  
“Businesses probably does business well, but they don’t actually do 
tax filing and preparing because that’s not what they actually do. 
There will still be a place for that sort of stuff to be done, there will be 
a certain element of people who will do it themselves, unfortunately, 
they are the ones that will spending the next 3 months trying to fix 
what they’ve done, that’s always the problem, no matter how simple 
you make the system…The other thing is that, what it means to, if it’s 
simple, people can just palm it off to the accountant to do at a lower 
cost, which will also provide an opportunity for the accountant to 
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provide other services, that they will find useful for the business on a 
day to day basis…it just changes the dynamics of what you 
[accountants] actually do”. 
(Tax Professional D, Tax Advisory Organisation) 
“The main compliance cost for small businesses is the accountant, 
when you take for example a taxi driver with an $8,000 accounting 
bill, that’s just absurd, they shouldn’t need to pay more than about 
$1,000 a year… ‘we [clients] view this as going to the dentist every 
year, it may be painful but you have to do it’ and I just think that’s the 
totally wrong way to approach it…they can’t get out of the paradigm 
that they need to prepare a full blown set of accounts”. 
(Tax Professional C, Medium Accounting Firm) 
A common theme amongst the responses is that business owners are not seeing the value 
in the financial reports prepared for their business. There seems to be a common 
understanding that businesses need to ultilise their accountants to produce financial 
reports for the purpose of tax compliance. A comment made that best describes this as 
follows: 
“The paradigm is that we need to rush to our accountant to get our 
year-end accounts for tax purposes. If we didn’t need that for tax, 
would people bother paying the accountant to do financial reports? It 
should be more about, if people are prepared to pay an accountant to 
prepare financial reports, they see the value in that, they are paying 
for value and so that’s fine, but if they get to the end of their income 
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year and all they want to do is get their tax number, then the question 
is should they be paying an accountant for separate accounts that they 
don’t really want to, but feel the as if they have to”. 
(Tax Professional A, Medium Accounting Firm) 
According to a one tax professional, enhancements and the availability of accounting 
information systems already help reduce the compliance work for businesses. So 
therefore:  
“Yeah, well look, irrespective of whether you have a small business regime, that’s 
happening, whether it’s our industry or good chunks of our industry have woken 
up from that  or not is a different matter. But it’s just happening, you know the 
ability for software to meet compliance obligation to 90% level, is already there. 
So if you’re, you know in this profession and you’re not readying yourself into the 
management of businesses, then you’ll find that you won’t have a role”. 
(Tax Professional B, Tax Advisory Organisation) 
Overall, the comments indicate that the accounting role cannot simply be replaced by a 
small business tax regime. However, it will provide easier methods for those that want to 
meet their tax obligations themselves, which should translate into less time spent by 
accountants on compliance as well. By lowering the time spent on compliance activities, 
an accountant has the opportunity to provide other value-adding services to businesses 
beyond tax compliance. It appears that some of the accounting profession working with 
smaller businesses need to move away from the old paradigm of merely producing 
financials for the purpose of compliance, and move towards more of an advisory role 
where businesses see the value of paying for one. 
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5.3.2.3 Accounting Information Systems 
The comments made in the above section show that a lot of the compliance work is 
handled by accounting software systems. The findings from the interviews show that 
there is a growth in the take up of computerised accounting systems. Comments that 
support this are presented here: 
“Yes, big growth, which has shifted a lot of our GST clients away from 
BankLink software and onto Xero. For me, it’s about getting all of our 
data in one place and getting the information we want from it 
easily…there is a continuing trend, New Zealand would have the 
greatest up take worldwide, you’d be amazed actually, how backwards 
some places are”. 
(Tax Professional E, Small Accounting Firm) 
“Yeah it depends on the size of the business…I don’t advocate a 
particular [accounting] software, I tell them to find one that’s 
applicable for you. But it’s certainly easier, and I encourage many 
people to use this to manage their finances, not just businesses”. 
(Tax Professional F, Small Accounting Firm) 
The shift to computerised accounting systems is clearly encouraged by tax professionals, 
as most compliance work preparation can be undertaken through various accounting 
software package. This leads onto another comment about designing the small business 
regime through consulting accountants, bankers, the IRD, and software developers. By 
creating a simplified tax system with an optimised accounting software system, 
transferring data from the business to the IRD or other users of the information, would 
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immensely reduce compliance costs, as there will be no need immediate need for an 
accountant for compliance activities. It would further reinforce a movement for 
accountants to be advisors rather than bookkeepers. This could be easily implemented in 
New Zealand, as described above, there is increasing up take of accounting software 
systems, which could put New Zealand ahead of the world in small business tax 
simplification. The comment below describes this concept: 
“I think if you can go and get your accountants, your bankers, the 
IRD, and software developers and say look these are the rules we are 
going to work. What you can do is get the accountants to become 
advisors, rather than bookkeepers, so you encourage them to change 
their business model, you can get bankers to understand the financial 
numbers, and if you can get your software developers to implement all 
of this, then it’s an easy add on”. 
(Tax Professional A, Medium Accounting Firm) 
5.3.2.4 Mandatory or Optional Concessions 
Over the years with the different tax regimes for small businesses, there can be two ways 
to structure concessions, either making all concessions mandatory or optional whereby 
the business can ‘pick and choose’. As seen in the Australian and the UK regimes, 
mandatory provisions such as cash accounting in Australia (Tretola, 2007) or fixed-rate 
motoring expenses in the UK (Association of Taxation Technicians, 2013), were not 
favoured by among taxpayers, which resulted in lower take up rates. When those 
mandatory provisions were removed from the respective regimes, there was an immediate 
increase in the take up rates. The counter argument is that, having optional concessions 
adds complexity to the already complex tax laws (Cooper, 1993), as ‘tinkering’ and 
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adding a set of rules on top of an existing set of rules, effectively adds more layers of 
complexity. The general consensus among the tax professionals is to keep the concessions 
mandatory for those that choose to enter the regime: 
“From the research we did, you need to do a package, if you just do 
one, you’re just fiddling around the edges, and that’s what happened 
unfortunately”. 
(Tax Professional D, Tax Advisory Organisation) 
“My knee-jerk reaction would be to make it compulsory, tax regime s 
are always going to be broad brush and imperfect, I think where we 
fall into difficulty is where we try to make it perfect, which that is 
simply not possible, and what we do is add more and more layers of 
complexity, with the intent to make it more perfect and equitable…I 
don’t like the idea of having lots of rules for lots of different people, if 
we can avoid it”. 
(Tax Professional E, Small Accounting Firm) 
Depending on what concessions are put into the regime, as outlined above, some 
concessions are intertwined with each other (such as cash accounting and simpler 
depreciation), then the concessions may have to be mandatory. 
5.4 Summary 
This chapter examined the technical aspects of a small business regime that could be 
implemented in New Zealand, and more importantly, answered the second research 
question: 
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RQ2. Of the tax regimes (and specific provisions) implemented or proposed in these 
selected countries, which of them, if implemented, could be expected to reduce the 
compliance costs of taxation for small businesses in New Zealand? 
Most concessions set out in Chapter 4 were generally believed to be capable of reducing 
compliance costs. The concessions should be structured as a mandatory set of rules for 
taxpayers. In terms of thresholds for entry into the regime, the best fit would most likely 
be to align with the GST thresholds, where under $60,000 would be micro, and $60,000 
and over but under $2 million would be small. However, a review of the GST thresholds 
is necessary, as there is no indexation of these thresholds, and this number may be 
obsolete.  
Another important factor is to incorporate different thresholds for entry into and exit from 
the regime, because it can be very costly for businesses sitting at the margins. Finally, an 
accountant’s role for the small business should be less on bookkeeping and more on 
advisory work. There needs to be a shift in the old paradigm for some accounting 
professionals, as businesses should be paying for value adding activities, rather than 
merely compliance activities.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusions, Limitations 
and Future Research 
6.1 Conclusions 
This thesis was set out to explore the possibility of introducing a tax regime in New 
Zealand which intends to reduce the taxation compliance costs for small business 
taxpayers. The research was motivated by the lack of government support for small 
businesses, while the compliance costs continue to adversely affect small businesses. As 
the concept of a separate regime for small businesses is new to New Zealand, the study 
sought information from other countries that have had experience with small business tax 
regimes, created for the purpose of reducing compliance costs. The study sought to 
answer the following two research questions: 
RQ1. What tax regimes are currently in place (or proposed) for small businesses, in a 
group of selected countries, to reduce the tax compliance burden of these businesses? 
RQ2. Of the tax regimes (and specific provisions) implemented or proposed in these 
selected countries, which of them, if implemented, could be expected to reduce the 
compliance costs of taxation for small businesses in New Zealand? 
First, the study sought information about different small business tax regimes 
implemented in several countries around the world. The aim was to identify similarities 
and differences related to the aspects of each regime, such as the eligibility thresholds, 
concessions offered, with some general comments made. It was found that the thresholds 
to enter the regime differed from country to country, with the lowest in the UK (turnover 
of NZD$167,670) whereas the highest were Australia and South Africa (turnover of 
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NZD$2,140,000 and NZD$2,200,000, respectively). In terms of concessions offered, a 
final combined list consisted of: 
 Cash accounting 
 Simpler depreciation rules 
 Simpler trading stock rules 
 Different tax rates 
 Timing of payments 
 Start-up deductions 
 Simplified cell phone deductions – can be broader to include communication 
expenses, such as internet 
 Simplified home office deductions 
This list of concessions gives a general idea of what could be expected in a small business 
tax regime. Two contradicting arguments were made about the appropriate structure to 
implement the concessions: the first is that taxpayers do not appear to favour mandatory 
provisions, while secondly simply adding an optional set of rules on top of an existing tax 
system tends to add additional layers of complexity. This becomes problematic for policy 
development. Based on the comments made on overseas regimes, there have not been 
many compelling arguments for a specific regime for small businesses. 
Secondly, the thesis attempted to shed light on the feasibility of introducing a 
concessionary regime for New Zealand small business. Six tax professionals participated 
in a series of semi-structured interviews. The participants were selected using preferential 
sampling that required the person to have experience with the New Zealand tax system 
and a particular interest with small businesses tax compliance. All of the tax concessions 
were believed to be feasible in New Zealand, some used reduce compliance costs and 
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others used to compensate smaller businesses with a special deduction. The tax 
professionals were optimistic that a small business regime can be implemented in New 
Zealand. It appears that the effectiveness in reducing compliance costs varies among the 
concessions. Overall, the interviewees believe that simplicity should be the overarching 
principle when designing the rules of a small business tax regime. 
Thirdly, this study finds that the role of an accountant needs to change for some, if they 
wish to continue to add value to small business, both now and into the future. With 
developments including the accessibility of accounting software, businesses can reduce 
the amount of manual compliance work, what is often done by owners, staff and 
accountants. By introducing the possibility of a small business tax regime in New 
Zealand, it is expected that accountants will receive less traditional work related to 
bookkeeping. Therefore, accountants can focus on offering other services that add value 
to businesses. 
The study has shown that there is a need for changes in the current tax environment for 
small businesses. It is evident from the overseas regimes that their regimes do not fully 
address the compliance costs of small business, but New Zealand has an opportunity to 
learn from the experiences in overseas regimes, and to provide a more effective regime. 
As the research is exploratory it builds a foundation for future research into the area of 
small business tax regimes.  
6.2 Limitations  
Due to the scope of this thesis, it was important to set pre-determined boundaries to 
ensure the study was completed in time with the resources provided. The research 
methods used in this study, documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews, contain 
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individual limitations, while sharing the limitations of being qualitative in nature. 
Qualitative research requires more time spent on collecting information compared to 
collecting quantitative data, which, with the time frame allocated for this study, results in 
a fewer number of subjects studied. 
Documentary analysis was used to collect information about the small business tax 
regimes from New Zealand and overseas. Using this method requires searching through 
various information sources to collect enough information to build a case study. However, 
a major limitation of this is it not possible to include every document about the regimes, 
as there is just too much information, especially in now, in the era of the ‘information 
superhighway’. Furthermore, with limited resources of a Master’s thesis, not all 
documents were accessible by the researcher, especially since most of the information 
was collected from foreign countries. One method the researcher undertook to mitigate 
these limitations was revisiting useful information sources, to ensure all information is 
up-to-date. 
The number of countries studied in this thesis was limited to five due to time constraints. 
The countries studied were similar in that they were largely common law countries. 
However, the focal point of this thesis was New Zealand, which is also operates on the 
basis of common law country. 
Semi-structured interviews were used to collect the information about the possibility of 
introducing a small business tax regime in New Zealand. As stated above, using more 
qualitative research methods reduces the number of participants able to be studied, given 
the time frame. This thesis interviewed six tax professionals that had particular 
experience working with small businesses. As mentioned in Chapter 3, section 3.4.3, 
prior research has found that a minimum of twelve interviews is required to gather 
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sufficient information. Due to time constraints, this was unachievable in this study. 
Furthermore, the participants were selected due to their experience and interest with small 
businesses, so there may be bias in the responses. However, this was acceptable in this 
study because the intention was to obtain the opinions of people who work with smaller 
businesses and understand their needs, in terms of tax compliance. 
The interviews only studied the opinions of tax professionals, and not the small business 
taxpayer, whom are arguably the users of the small business tax regime. This thesis 
excluded small business taxpayers due to the availability of interested candidates and the 
time constraints of this study. 
6.3 Contributions and Directions for Future Research 
In general, this thesis has contributed to the limited body of literature, and provides a 
foundation for future research and policy development on small business tax regimes in 
New Zealand. At present, there is a large body of literature that provides evidence to 
suggest that small businesses face a disproportionate tax compliance burden as opposed to 
larger entities. The case studies have found that most countries either offer a separate 
regime for small businesses or provide concessions to relieve the compliance burden on 
smaller businesses. Therefore, the objectives introduced in this thesis aims to put forward 
an argument to support smaller businesses through the development of a small business 
tax regime. 
In order to understand what a small business regime could look like, this thesis provides a 
comparative analysis of five countries that has implemented (or proposed, in the case of 
New Zealand) a regime. The key components of each regime (entry thresholds and 
concessions offered) are compared using a standardised measure (New Zealand 
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currency). At the time of this thesis, there have been no other studies that make such a 
comparison.  
This thesis was also one of the first studies that analysed the proposed regime (NZICA 
and TMNZ) in New Zealand. This presents the possibility of revising the NZICA and 
TMNZ proposals 
This thesis also provides the opinions on the feasibility of a small business tax regime in 
New Zealand by tax professionals. Again, this adds a unique dimension (practicality 
aspect) to the, already, limited body of literature in New Zealand about small business tax 
regimes.  
The limitations and contributions of this thesis present opportunities for future research. 
Firstly, only five countries, with similar law systems, were studied in this thesis. Future 
research should expand upon these countries and seek other countries that have 
implemented a similar regime. The tabled results in Chapter 4 section 4.7.1 and 4.7.2, 
provides a template for further comparison.  
Another limitation was that, only the opinions of tax professionals were gauged, 
especially those with particular interest with small business. Later studies could 
incorporate a wider range of tax professionals for comparisons. Furthermore, gauging the 
opinions of the small business taxpayers and policy developers would provide a richer 
understanding of how a small business regime should be designed. Small business 
taxpayers could give a better understanding of what would be helpful in terms of policy, 
in reducing tax compliance burdens. 
The development of a small business tax regime to reduce the tax compliance costs will 
require more work. This thesis creates a baseline for further discussion and debate on this 
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topic, with the intention to level the playing for smaller business in terms of compliance 
burden. 
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Chapter 8: Appendices 
8.1 Appendix A - Human Ethics Approval Letter 
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8.2 Appendix B – Interview Guide 
Semi-Structured Interview with Tax Professionals 
The semi-structured interview will gauge the opinions related to the concessionary 
features of a small business tax regime. The interviewees will be given a list of items 
outlining the type of concessions that are offered in different countries. The list will be 
emailed to the interviewee ahead of time, so they can think of ideas before the interview. 
1. From the list of concessions presented to you, which of them do you think will be 
feasible for New Zealand to implement? 
2. From the concessions you have mentioned out in (1), do you think that they would 
be effective at reducing the tax compliance burden for small businesses, and if so, 
why? 
3. From the concessions you did not think are feasible for New Zealand, which do 
you think can be effective at reducing the tax compliance burden for smaller 
businesses? 
4. Can you think of any other concession(s) or regime that would help reduce the 
compliance burden of small business taxpayers? 
5. Do you think that New Zealand should provide a tax system for smaller 
businesses in order to reduce their compliance burden? If so, why? If not, why 
not? 
Ideas to think about: 
1. If a small business tax regime were to be implemented, who should be the targeted 
audience (especially since many small businesses hire an accountant for their tax 
needs)? 
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2. With the upcoming changes to the reporting requirements from the IRD, could a 
small business tax regime still work in New Zealand? [Will elaborate with the 
interviewee]. 
 
8.3 Appendix C – List of Small Business Concessions 
Possible Small Business Tax Concessions 
Cash Accounting: Using cash receipts and payments to determine the taxable income. 
Simpler Depreciation: Assets costing under a certain amount (example, less than 
$1,000) can be immediately written off and claimed as a deduction. All other assets can 
be pooled and depreciated using a standard diminishing rate. 
Trading Stock:  Remove the need to conduct yearly stock takes. 
Different Tax Rates: Businesses will be able to calculate their income tax on a single flat 
rate. 
Timing of Payments: Businesses may file their returns at a more convenient time. 
Example could be paid at the same time as GST filing. 
Start-Up Deductions: start-up businesses can deduct up to a certain amount for start-up 
expenses. 
Cell Phone Deduction: Some businesses use cell phones more than landlines. If it can be 
separated between business and private,  
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8.4 Appendix D – Information Sheet for Tax Professionals 
College of Business and Economics 
Department of Accounting and Information Systems 
University of Canterbury 
Private Bag 4800 
Christchurch 
 
Researcher: David Ma 
Telephone: 021-185-6187 
Email: david.ma@pg.canterbury.ac.nz  
20 November 2014 
‘Small Business Tax Compliance Burden: What can be done to Level the Playing Field?’ 
 
Information Sheet for Tax Professionals 
 
My name is David Ma, and I am currently studying towards a Masters of Commerce degree at 
the University of Canterbury. The research that will be conducted will partly contribute to the 
completion of this degree. The study aims to explore the possibility of introducing a small 
business tax regime in New Zealand. As this research is exploratory in nature, all aspects of a 
small business regime will be considered. The results of the study will provide New Zealand 
policymakers and potentially the Inland Revenue Department with information that would help 
them decide whether New Zealand should introduce a tax system for small businesses. 
Your involvement in this project will be to express your professional opinion and share your 
experiences surrounding the idea of a small business tax regime. You will be asked to consider 
the feasibility of such a regime, in terms of the concessions offered, the effectiveness of 
concessions, and whether you believe it would be effective in New Zealand and/or other 
countries. You will be given the opportunity to elaborate on questions, which may be prompted 
by the researcher. It is estimated that the interview will take between 20 and 40 minutes. Prior 
to the commencement of the interviewing, you will be asked if the interview can be recorded 
with a voice recorder; the purpose of this allows for analysis and note taking after the interview.  
As a follow-up to this investigation, the notes and analysis will be available for you to review 
once it has been transcribed (usually 1 week after the interview). 
If any confidential and private information about you or your business was disclosed during the 
interview, this information will not be used.  
You may receive a copy of the project results by contacting the researcher at the conclusion of 
the project.  
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Participation is voluntary and you have the right to withdraw without penalty. If you decide to 
withdraw, I will remove information relating to you for up to a month after the interview, at 
which point any data or information cannot be withdrawn.  
The results of the project may be published, but you may be assured of the complete 
confidentiality of data gathered in this investigation: your identity will not be made public; you 
will be referred to, for example, as ‘Participant A’. The recordings will not be labelled with your 
name or organisation, but a general labelling system will be used, and the recordings will be 
stored on a computer protected with a password, and all written notes will be stored in a 
lockable filing cabinet. Upon completion of the project the recording and written notes will be 
held onto for a period of 5 years before being confidentially destroyed. These will only be 
accessible to me, and will only be viewed by myself and my supervisors. Please note that a thesis 
is a public document and will be available through the UC Library.  
The project is being carried out as part of my Masters of Commerce thesis under the supervision 
of Associate Professor Andrew Maples and Professor Adrian Sawyer, who can be contacted at 
+64 3 364 2636 and +64 3 3642617, respectively. Alternatively, they may also be contacted 
through their email addresses andrew.maples@canterbury.ac.nz and 
adrian.sawyer@canterbury.ac.nz respectively. They will be pleased to discuss any concerns you 
may have about participation in the project. 
This project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics 
Committee, and participants should address any complaints to the to the Chair, Human Ethics 
Committee, University of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch (human-
ethics@canterbury.ac.nz).  
If you agree to participate in the study, you are asked to complete the accompanying consent 
form and return this to me via email or post. 
 
David Ma  
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8.5 Appendix E – Tax Professional Consent Form 
College of Business and Economics 
Department of Accounting and Information Systems 
University of Canterbury 
Private Bag 4800 
Christchurch 
 
Researcher: David Ma 
Telephone: 021-185-6187 
Email: david.ma@pg.canterbury.ac.nz 
20 November 2014 
‘Small Business Tax Compliance Burden: What can be done to Level the Playing Field?’ 
 
Consent Form for Tax Professionals 
I have been given a full explanation of this project and have had the opportunity to ask 
questions.  
I understand what is required of me if I agree to take part in this research. 
I understand that participation is voluntary, and I may withdraw from the study without penalty 
up to one month after the interview has taken place. Withdrawal of participation will also 
include the withdrawal of any information I have provided should this remain practically 
achievable.  
I understand that any information or opinions I provide will be kept confidential to the 
researcher and the researcher’s supervisors, and that any published or reported results will not 
identify me or any of the other participants. I also consent to being audio-recorded during the 
interview. I understand that a thesis is a public document and will be available through the 
University of Canterbury Library. 
I understand that all data collected for the study will be kept in locked and secured facilities 
and/or in password protected electronic form and will be destroyed after five years. 
I understand that a thesis is a public document and will be available through the University of 
Canterbury Library. 
I understand that all data collected for the study will be kept in locked and secured facilities 
and/or in password protected electronic form and will be destroyed after five years. 
I understand the risks associated with taking part and how they will be managed. 
I understand that I am able to request a report on the findings of the study by contacting the 
researcher at the conclusion of the project during 2015. 
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I understand that I can contact the researcher, David Ma, at david.ma@pg.canterbury.ac.nz, or 
the researcher’s supervisors, Assoc. Prof. Andrew Maples, at andrew.maples@canterbury.ac.nz, 
or +64 3 364 2636, and Prof. Adrian Sawyer, at adrian.sawyer@canterbury.ac.nz, or +64 3 364 
2617, for further information. If I have any complaints, I can contact the Chair of the University 
of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch (human-
ethics@canterbury.ac.nz). 
By signing below, I agree to participate in this research project. 
Name: 
Date: 
Signature: 
 
 
Please email a scanned copy of the completed form to david.ma@pg.canterbury.ac.nz, if you 
would like to return it in person or post. Thank you for you participation. 
 
 
David Ma 
 
